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Thomas Wilks  
 
Coming To Terms With Distraction In German 
 
 
[This article represents work in progress on a larger book project, historicising, defining and comparing 
modes of distraction in European literature.  None of it has been submitted for publication or presented 
orally so far.  The article covers most of the key definitions and several of the key authors on the German 
side of the project: this focus reflects my research as Sylvia Naish Post-doctoral Research Fellow in 
Germanic Studies at the IGRS in 2009.] 
 
 
Distraction in English is associated with any of four concepts that may coincide in 
different combinations but which are denoted in separate terms in German (and also in the 
Romance languages).   I am seeking in my research on modelling distraction in European 
literature to historicise, compare and analyse significant examples of distraction as it is 
understood in English through making connections between modes of distraction that have 
tended to be treated differently in the languages of their original presentation.   I define 
distraction in literature as the reconfiguration of awareness by authors, readers and 
protagonists where objects or impulses divert them from norms of conceptualisation to 
focus on alternative connections.   Significant complication is posed for Anglophone 
readers of German by Zerstreuung, the most broadly connoted of the terms usually 
rendered as „distraction‟, and one which by its nature resists being pinned down. 
Zerstreuung has been appropriated inconsistently as its meaning has evolved; and its 
translation as „distraction‟ is not as straightforward as some of its users have arbitrarily 
assumed.  Furthermore, the proliferation of commentary on Zerstreuung alone should not 
eclipse the substantial insight into distraction in its multiple configurations that a balanced 
consideration of those forms that are not obviously translatable as Zerstreuung (and 
Zerstreutheit, which is sometimes but not always coterminous) will provide.  These forms 
are signified by Ablenkung (diversion; often synonymous with Zerstreuung), Verstörung 
(mental disturbance), Unaufmerksamkeit (inattention) and Unruhe (disquiet).  In the 
following, I shall explore some of the manifestations of conditions of distraction as they are 
presented in a selection of German literature and thought, to support the central 
hypothesis that my larger project will attempt to prove: that for readers, authors and 
protagonists, textual mediations of distraction mirror the social function of literature, in 
engendering reflection and expression in a space between perception and experience.  
This investigation represents work in progress on a project that will compare the dynamics 
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of distraction in English, French and German.  The comparison will be undertaken not only 
through the historicisation which I shall present selectively here, drawing on philosophy 
and critical theory, but also through close analysis of modern literary texts that exemplify 
and extend the modes of distraction to which it is hoped the overview below will attune the 
reader.   
 
Further terms beyond the primary signifiers above that are semantically associated with 
distraction also tend to differ in English and German.  I would contend that our 
understanding of distraction depends on the extent to which we emphasise either the 
negative prefix „di(s)-‟ or the sense of „traction‟ – albeit etymologically coincidental – with or 
without another prefix (especially attraction and abstraction). On the other hand, Lenkung, 
Störung, Aufmerksamkeit, Ruhe and, above all, Streuung all convey sensations that are 
not so obviously integral to the English understanding of distraction.  Furthermore, 
distraction and Zerstreuung have each evolved considerably beyond the restricted context 
in which they originated.  Distraction and Zerstreuung were taken in the late Middle Ages 
from the Latin distractio-, denoting a state of being drawn apart, in particular from God.1  In 
its adoption from the outset of „traction‟ from the Latin verb „trahere‟ (to draw, drag), 
English has foregrounded locomotion – a term that becomes a useful intermediary for 
connecting distraction to the condition of the flâneur, or idler, comparable to the sense of 
„streunen‟ that links the Streuner to Zerstreuung in German.   
  
 
Distraction in Mind: Verstörung 
 
In modelling distraction as a condition of mind, we must grapple with two problems that 
relate to the illusion of transparency in codified signification.  One of these problems is of 
the modelling and terming of discrete phenomena in flows of discourses and of the 
concerns of those discourses.  The dangers of modelling the mind have been pointed out 
for psychiatry by Miriam Siegler and Humphry Osmond, who warn that „modern medicine 
postulates eight clearly differentiated models for mental illness‟, which are almost cognate 
with distraction in themselves, being merely „abstractions.  They are inventions of the 
                                            
1
 Examples of how Zerstreutheit, cognate with Zerstreuung, represented a social view of the non-conformist 
individual in learned society prior to the Enlightenment are provided by Gadi Algazi in „Gelehrte Zerstreutheit 
und gelernte Vergeßlichkeit: Bemerkungen zu ihrer Rolle in der Herausbildung des Gelehrtenhabitus‟, 
<http://www.tau.ac.il/~algazi/texts/Zerstreutheit.pdf> (originally in Peter van Moos, ed., Der Fehltritt: 
Vergehen und Versehen in der Vormoderne. Cologne: Böhlau, 2001, pp. 235-50). This and all subsequently 
cited internet sources were consulted on 6 November 2009. 
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human mind to place facts, events, and theories in an orderly manner.  They are not 
necessarily true or false.‟2  Applying this observation to literary studies, the Germanist 
Sander L. Gilman succinctly summarises these models as „ordering principles, nothing 
more, nothing less‟;3 they are anchors around which we might orientate ourselves in the 
context of flows between any number of points constellated in the sum total of these 
models.  While the kind of „flow‟ that Gilman identifies derives from the psychological mode 
of positively focused mental operation distinguished by Mihály Csíkszentmihályi,4 the flow 
of modern media streams will prove equally relevant to us when we come to relate 
distraction to patterns of entertainment and attention. The dangers of arbitrarily assigning 
models apply, I would argue, beyond psychiatry, and certainly within what German 
appositely terms the Geisteswissenschaften, which signify the workings of the mind in a 
somewhat more arbitrary juxtaposition with a putative “knowledge-scape” than the 
explicitly humanist humanities in the English language.  The second problem is of 
euphemism, which, although fundamental to distraction as more than a mental state, is 
especially resonant for the Anglophone reader.  Analysis of distraction in its early English 
literary usage needs to draw considerably on the development of the adjective distraught, 
a modification of distrac‟.5  Distraction in the Renaissance era covered a spectrum of 
mental conditions;6 today, set expressions – most commonly „to be driven to distraction‟ – 
                                            
2
 Siegler & Osmond, Models of Madness, Models of Medicine.  London: MacMillan, 1974, p. xviii.  Alongside 
the medical model, they compare the moral model, the impaired model, the psychoanalytic model, the social 
model, the psychedelic model, the conspiratorial model and the family interaction model.  
3
 Gilman, „On The Use and Abuse of the History of Psychiatry for Literary Studies‟.  Deutsche 
Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 52:3 (Sept. 1978), 381-399  (p. 381). 
4
 Cf. Csíkszentmihályi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. New York: Harper Row, 1990. 
5
 Notable usages, both from about 1591, are to be found in Edmund Spenser‟s sonnets „The Ruin[e]s of 
Time‟ (a translation of Joaquim Du Bellay‟s sonnet cycle Les Antiquités de Rome [1558]): „And I in mind 
remained sore aghast | distraught twixt fear and pity‟ (The Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser, Vol. 5. 
Edinburgh: Nichol, 1866, p. 22); and in Shakespeare‟s Richard III, in a speech delivered to the King by his 
brother the Duke of Gloucester in Act III, Scene V: „As if thou wert distraught and mad with terror‟ 
(Shakespeare, Richard III, ed. Janis Lull. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 199).  In his 
German translation of this play (1810), A. W. Schlegel – who, as we shall shortly note, was familiar with the 
possibilities for translating distraction from the French – renders the first of Shakespeare‟s adjectives as 
„außer dir‟ („wie außer dir und irr im Geist vor Schrecken‟: in Shakespeare, Dramatische Werke, Vol. 3.  
Berlin: Reimer, 1840, p. 309).  Schlegel thus underlines separation in spirit, as well as the division between 
the form of distraction that is denoted by Verstörung, or  becoming distraught, and full-blown insanity.     
6
 Cf. Carol Thomas Neely, Distracted Subjects: Madness And Gender in Shakespeare and Early Modern 
Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), who chooses „distraction‟ as her key term for conditions of 
madness and melancholy as it reflects attitudes of the period she surveys „toward madness as a temporary 
derailing‟ (p. 2).  The labels „Early Modern‟ and „modern‟ in relation to historical periods cannot always be 
applied compatibly when we draw upon critical studies produced at different times and in different 
disciplines.  Central to my study is the Modernist thought that came to prominence in the early twentieth 
century, during which multiple forms of distraction emerged as significant topoi.  For the purposes of the 
present study, „early modernism‟ would most logically designate the precedence of nineteenth-century 
French culture for the German Modernist criticism spearheaded by Walter Benjamin.  This chronology has 
been applied by Ross Chambers in his study of melancholy, The Writing of Melancholy: Modes of Opposition 
in Early French Modernism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993; a translation from French of a less 
ambiguous title, Mélancolie et opposition: les débuts du modernisme en France [Paris: Corti, 1987]).  Central 
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are all that remains of this usage.  Nevertheless, Neely favours the term „distraction‟ to 
encompass „all forms of mental distress7 in order to defamiliarize the condition and to 
express the inner experiences of sufferers as they perceived themselves and were 
perceived by others‟ (Neely 3).   If we leave aside the concern with suffering that instigates 
much of the socio-cultural analysis of mental illness (and which is central to Neely‟s study), 
her eschewal of „the, to us, more familiar terms “madness” and “melancholy” [which both] 
exist on a continuum and signify conditions either figurative or literal and ranging from mild 
to severe‟ (Neely 3) finds its mirror in Thomas Bernhard‟s titular primacy of Verstörung in 
his 1967 novel over any thematised “Wahnsinn” or “Melancholie”.   
 
The influence of Bernhard‟s Verstörung is underscored by the attention paid to it in essays 
by two other leading Germanic narrators of distraction within a generation of Bernhard – 
Peter Handke and W. G. Sebald, whose approaches to combined modes of distraction will 
also be scrutinised in my extended project.8  Bernhard‟s novel was not translated as 
Derangement, as Stephen D. Dowden suggests it might have been,9 because range is 
maintained rather than lost over the course of the episodic narrative.  A range of medical 
conditions afflict a range of personalities over a rural geographical range of the Austrian 
Steiermark, and these are presented in hierarchical terms, all within the range of the first-
person narrator but eventually subsumed by the extended monologue from Prince Saurau 
                                                                                                                                                 
to his survey is Baudelaire‟s poetry, including „Le Cygne‟, on which Chambers focuses his attention more 
acutely in Loiterature, his subsequent study of digression as a mode of distraction (Lincoln, Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1999, especially p. 215ff.).  In film studies, „early modernists‟ are identified in 
the dialectical context of attraction/distraction as Futurists, Dadaists and Surrealists (cf. Tom Gunning, „The 
Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde‟ [1986], in Robert Stam and Toby Miller, 
eds., Film And Theory: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, pp. 229-235 [p. 229]).  The appropriation of 
15
th
-18
th
 century „Early Modern‟ culture in today‟s scholarship, typified by Neely, does not reflect evident 
mainstream Modernist concerns relating to distraction: however, a culture of distraction is to be found in this 
earlier period, too, which has been taken up in the literary context of trauma studies; cf. Thomas Anderson‟s 
identification of multiple forms of distraction in John Webster‟s elegy „A Monumental Columne‟ (1613), in 
which a „reconfigured corpse metamorphoses into a literary body of work‟, and to further allusions by 
Shakespeare in the Comedy of Errors (Act 5, Scene 1) and in Hamlet (Act 5, Scene 5), in Anderson's 
Performing Early Modern Trauma from Shakespeare to Milton (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, pp. 173-4).  
7
 „Distress‟ is an etymological red herring for this study: although synonymous with the most severe kind of 
mental confusion in the spectrum considered here, the word has a separate derivation (Latin distringere); 
and its German translations offer ample scope for another expansive project.  
8
 Cf. Peter Handke, „Als ich Verstörung von Thomas Bernhard las‟ (1967), in Prosa Gedichte Theaterstücke 
Hörspiel Aufsätze (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969, pp. 293-97); and W. G. Sebald, „Wo die Dunkelheit 
den Strick zuzieht.  Zu Thomas Bernhard‟, in Beschreibung des Unglücks: Zur österreichischen Literatur von 
Stifter bis Handke (Salzburg: Residenz, 1985, pp. 103-114; an earlier version was published in Literatur und 
Kritik, 155 [1981]).  
9
 Dowden, Understanding Thomas Bernhard.  Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991, p. 24f.  
The English translation is entitled Gargoyles (trans. Richard and Clara Winston.  Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1970), which signifies distortions of character as observed and further mediated by the 
narrator. 
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that dominates the latter part of the narrative (p. 78ff.).10  The Prince, who resides on a 
mountain peak, also occupies the highest social and psychological ranks of the novel‟s 
hierarchical ranges.  His disturbance is the most severe because he cannot properly 
execute a state of distraction from his own self-absorption of the kind that we have 
encountered earlier in the novel in the figure of the industrialist – a mode of living that 
might have sustained the Prince in his comparable isolation.  Dreaming does not distract 
the Prince but it instead engenders scholarly contemplation and a self-defining stream of 
monologue indistinguishable from the meanderings of his wakeful discourse: „Wenn ich 
träume, richte ich zuerst mein Augenmark auf die ganze Welt, dann erst auf das Traum, 
den ich träume, indem ich ihn mir streng wissenschaftlich erarbeite.  Das Gefühl, das 
einen Menschen sich dem Tod entziehen läßt auf längere, kürzere Zeit, wir haben es oft, 
ist für mich mit langen verständlichen oder unverständlichen Sätzen grob 
zusammengeheftet‟.11  The Prince recapitulates his condition a few pages later: „Ich 
versuche, mich von mir abzulenken, aber es gelingt mir nur mehr sporadisch‟ (p. 221); by 
contrast, we recall that „der Industrielle, der sich [. . .] in ein Jagdhaus zurückgezogen 
habe, sei auf eine ihn gleichzeitig quälende und von der Qual an sich selber ablenkende 
schriftstellerische Arbeit konzentriert‟ (p. 50).  In both cases, the symbolic thread of 
Verstörung is related to the individual‟s pursuit of Ablenkung, thus positing distraction over 
a range of frames of mind.  Within this range, the narrator and his father, a physician, who 
his son is accompanying on peripatetic duties, occupy the other extreme in their mobile 
social engagement, as they diminish any self-absorption of their own with the severe 
cases they encounter in the patients.  Engagement, that is, to the extent of becoming party 
to the conditions of these scattered (zerstreute) patients; to a greater extent, the son is a 
detached observer who has sought – and who focalises the patients exhibiting – 
Ablenkung.  This form of diversion from self-absorption represents an ideal, the model 
outcome for the narrator in shadowing his father‟s work, in an attempt to bring focus to his 
own career development.  Whether the narrating son succeeds in attaining this level of 
distraction depends on the impact he feels of the juxtapositions of „Verstörung‟ presented 
without any suggestion of apparent resolution by the perceptions of the patients or the 
narrator.  Such Ablenkung also resonates with the Queen‟s pre-performance routine in 
                                            
10
 Cf. Gudrun Brokoph-Mauch, „Thomas Bernhard‟, in Donald G. Daviau, ed., Major Figures of Austrian 
Literature (Berne: Lang, 1987, pp. 89-115): „the author goes as far as to establish a distinct hierarchy of the 
various diseases, beginning with physical sepsis and ending with highly spiritual insanity.  Each disease 
correlates with the social rank and intellectual capacity of the individual and is located in a landscape divided 
into high, middle and low regions‟ (p. 94).  An overview of interpretations of Verstörung that relate to binary 
oppositions within these ranges (e.g. mountain and valley; spirit and corporeality) is offered by Michael 
Grabber in Der Protagonist im Erzählwerk Thomas Bernhards (Innsbruck: Korde, 2004, p. 101). 
11
 Bernhard, Verstörung (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1967), p. 215.   
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Bernhard‟s drama Der Ignorant und der Wahnsinnige (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1972): „Vor der Vorstellung | gehe ich natürlich | meiner Person aus dem Weg | ich lenke 
mich ab | ich horche | ich höre‟ (Bernhard, Der Ignorant, p. 74).  However, whereas both 
the Queen and the doctor‟s son embody the art of interpretation and presentation, 
complete with its emotional ramifications, the doctors in both works promulgate scientific 
diagnosis and remedy, dismissing distraction in its non-distraught (or non-verstört) forms: 
„Ablenkung | Aber natürlich | ist Ablenkung unmöglich‟ (Der Ignorant, p. 75).   
 
Verstörung is preceded by a quotation from Blaise Pascal: „Das ewige Schweigen dieser 
unendlichen Räume macht mich schaudern‟.12  Taken out of Pascal‟s context, the 
ambiguity of „Räume‟ makes this line cryptic, whether or not parallels are made with 
Bernhard‟s subsequent prefatory citations from the same source.  One of these citations, 
provided in the original French, consolidates Bernhard‟s position in the canon of distraction 
as a voluntary mode of behaviour signified in German by either Ablenkung or Zerstreuung:  
„Les misères de la vie humaine ont fondé tout cela; comme ils ont vu cela, ils ont pris le 
divertissement‟ (Pensée 167, in Bernhard, Am Ziel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1981).13  Pascal‟s allusion in the first citation is to limitless spaces, as opposed to rooms: 
the latter are distinguished not as Räume but as Zimmer.  By contrasting these two sites, 
we can correlate Bernhard‟s perspectives with others that situate distraction in 
circumstances of either boundlessness or confinement.  Pascal qualifies his spatial setting 
in Pensée 205: he is frightened by „the little space which I fill, and even can see, engulfed 
in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant, and which know me not‟.  These 
infinite spaces are exemplified in Bernhard‟s Verstörung by the panoramic view from the 
grounds of Prince Saurau‟s castle, „ein tatsächlich in jede Richtung hinein Hunderte von 
                                            
12
 Several editions of Pascal‟s Pensées exist in French, English and German, in which the individual 
fragments have been arranged in different configurations that complicate comparison between the three 
languages that I intend to feature in my project. For an overview of the French versions, see John 
Cruickshank, Pascal: Pensées (London: Grant & Cutler, 2
nd
 ed. 1998 [1983]), pp. 28-33.  My references will 
be to the most accessible English edition, which numbers the Pensées in a single continuous sequence: 
W.F. Trotter, ed. & trans., Pascal’s Pensées.  Project Gutenberg, Ebook 18269, 2006 (first ed. London: Dent, 
1931) <http://www.gutenberg.org/1/8/2/6/18269/>.  The translation in Bernhard‟s Verstörung (p. 5) is of 
Pensée 206. 
13
 Cf. also the German translation of Pascal‟s Pensée 168 preceding Bernhard‟s autobiographical Der Atem: 
Eine Entscheidung (Suhrkamp, 1978), which posits distraction as a realignment of thoughts away from the 
misery and uncertainty of death: „Da die Menschen unfähig waren, Tod, Elend, Unwissenheit zu überwinden, 
sind sie, um glücklich zu sein, übereingekommen, nicht daran zu denken‟.  Der Atem covers a few months of 
its narrator‟s young life, during which he, like the doctor‟s son in Verstörung, attempts to reorientate himself 
in order to clarify his vocational goals.  Unlike the doctor‟s son, however, this narrator, hospitalised with a 
lung complaint, has given up his studies for a career in sales and has broken off his musical training.  He 
finds that distraction from the latter in favour of the former has been assumed on his behalf by his bedside 
visitors: „sie versuchten ununterbrochen während ihrer Großgmainer Besuche, direkt oder indirekt, mich auf 
den Kaufmann zu- und von dem Sänger abzulenken‟ (Der Atem, p. 153). 
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Kilometern weiter Blick‟ (Verstörung, p. 78), which the narrator has barely taken in before 
the narrative enters the Prince‟s inner world.  Vast, unfathomable spaces are also 
encountered in the patients‟ uncontained states of mind as they are explored in parallel 
with the topography of the Steiermark, but these represent only a cross-section taken on 
one day, „in einem verhältnismäßig großen und außerdem schwierigen Gebiet‟ (p. 7) that 
lacks stability to such an extent that it cannot be comprehensively charted.  While the 
doctor admits from the outset that „oft ist mir alles zuviel‟ (p. 8), he nevertheless steadily 
occupies himself each day with these unresolved cases within the bounds of his 
professional duty.  However, the outcome for his son after this single session of work-
shadowing is an exacerbation of the problem of distraction from selfhood that underlies the 
narrative as a whole.   The narrator‟s channelling of multiple encounters with distracted 
trains of thoughts heightens the sense of restlessness signified among the multiple facets 
of distraction.  The state of being „distracted from distraction by distraction‟14 thus appears 
perpetual rather than remedial. 
 
Convergences of Distraction: Pascal, Genazino, Kafka and Modernist Theories 
 
Pascal‟s contrast between infinite space and single-room captivity, expanded in two further 
key Pensées, forms a hypotext for the literary treatment of man‟s need to be distracted 
from spatial, temporal and spiritual confinement. Pascal is most explicit about this need in 
the first sentence of Pensée 131: „Nothing is so insufferable to man as to be completely at 
rest, without passions, without business, without diversion, without study‟.  The use here of 
„diversion‟ indicates the kind of distraction denoted in German by either Ablenkung or 
Zerstreuung: the latter term suggests a plurality of focal points arising in the shift away 
from a source that distraction entails; the former term signals more emphatically the 
breaking of a connection, of a Lenkung, or chain, which in its loss of linkage no longer 
exhibits this plurality.  Moreover, only Zerstreuung conveys the positive experience of 
entertainment, especially in those forms that we tend to label „light entertainment‟.  
Ablenkung, by contrast, tends to be governed by its negative prefix, and in Pascal‟s 
context, only Zerstreuung thus illustrates the human need for variety in our lives, which 
may be provided by stimuli of many kinds.  Ablenkung would have resonated as 
disconnection from man‟s linkage to God, the context under which many of Pascal‟s most 
                                            
14
 An expression coined by T. S. Eliot in his poem „Burnt Norton‟, the first of his Four Quartets (New York: 
Brace, Harcourt, 1943, p. 6), which succinctly emphasises the ubiquity of distraction.  Eliot‟s engagement 
with Pascal dates back further: cf. his Introduction to Trotter‟s edition of the Pensées. 
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relevant remarks on distraction both as diversion and as unrest are grouped in many 
editions of the Pensées.15  
 
While Pascal‟s assertion in Pensée 131 is emblematic for Zerstreuung as a correlative of 
Unruhe and as a source of Verstörung, he attributes in Pensée 139 – entitled, like several 
others, „Diversion‟ – „the different distractions of men‟ to the confinement of the „Zimmer‟, 
expressing a view that has recurrently been transposed in German literature beyond the 
negative overtones of unhappiness in which he frames it.  In Achtung Baustelle, Wilhelm 
Genazino cites the crux of this Pensée in an unattributed German translation.  Genazino's 
context is a collection of analyses of literary remarks that do not always suffice as 
aphorisms in themselves, but which he posits as aphoristic in their intertextual substance.  
He challenges Pascal‟s notion that the „ganze Unglück der Menschen aus einer einzigen 
Ursache kommt: nicht ruhig in einem Zimmer bleiben zu können‟.  Staying in a room is not 
necessarily coterminous with Unruhe but it is, rather, an uncommon test of endurance that 
enables us to negotiate the outside world: „Vermutlich ist der Satz deshalb so beliebt, weil 
wir einerseits seine Wahrheit erkennen, andererseits aber nicht wissen, wie wir ihr 
genügen sollen.  Denken wir nur an unser Erwerbsleben, dem niemand nachgehen kann, 
ohne von Zeit zu Zeit sein Zimmer zu verlassen‟.16  Genazino favours a remark made in a 
radio interview by Harold Pinter that presents the intense stasis of undistracted (self-
)contemplation as a coping mechanism that is an essential precondition for interaction 
amid the dynamic distractions of society: „Bevor man es nicht geschafft hat, in einem 
Zimmer zu leben, kann man nicht hinausgehen und kämpfen‟.17  Moreover, confinement in 
a room counters the form of distraction termed Unruhe; and it enables contemplation, 
                                            
15
 The second section of Trotter‟s edition of the Pensées (containing nos. 60-183) is entitled „The Misery of 
Man Without God‟: this context renders distraction a fundamentally negative phenomenon.  My larger project 
will investigate more extensively the dynamics of distraction in Pascal, picking up on the dialectics of 
divertissement, ennui and bonheur that have been elucidated by Nicholas Hammond in Playing With Truth: 
Language and the Human Condition in Pascal’s ‘Pensées’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 109-114 and 
155-162).  Particular attention will be paid to the distinctions between the French use of diversion in a 
positive sense, exemplified by Montaigne, and the evolving connotations of divertissement, Pascal‟s 
favoured term, which rivals – but does not always parallel – Zerstreuung in its convoluted development. 
16
 Genazino, Achtung Baustelle.  Frankfurt am Main: Schöffling, 1998, p. 38. 
17
 This sentence forms the title of Genazino‟s commentary (Achtung Baustelle, pp. 38-39).  Its English 
source is a BBC Home Service radio interview with Pinter by Kenneth Tynan, 19 August 1960 (first 
broadcast 28 October 1960): „Before you‟ve managed to adjust yourself to living alone in your room [. . .] you 
are not really terribly fit and equipped to go out and fight the battles which are fought mostly in abstractions 
in the outside world‟.  (Citation pieced together from slightly differently extrapolated fragments in Peter Raby, 
„Introduction‟, in Peter Raby, The Cambridge Companion To Harold Pinter.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p. 10, and Elizabeth Sakellaridou, Pinter’s Female Portraits: A Study of Female 
Characters in the Plays of Harold Pinter.  Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, p. 4.)  My emphasis here of Pinter‟s 
conflation of abstractions with distractions facilitates our understanding of Zerstreuung as a shift away from 
concretion, and it points up the definition of Zerstreuung proposed by Kant that I shall shortly consider.  
Genazino‟s citation (unattributed) unsurprisingly excludes the last clause of Pinter‟s sentence, as distraction 
in his narrative invariably embraces concrete objects as well as abstract impressions of them.  
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which Zerstreuung in its Modernist definitions has opposed: „Pinter enthüllt die bloß 
kompensatorische Funktion von Ruhe, von der Pascal vielleicht noch nichts hat ahnen 
können.  Die Besinnung im Zimmer, so wir sie zustande bringen, ist kaum mehr als eine 
Vorbereitung auf das oft besinnungslose Leben, um das wir draußen “kämpfen” müssen‟ 
(Achtung Baustelle 38).    
 
Genazino as a novelist is an architect of distraction in several of its forms.  His first major 
novel sequence alone, the Abschaffel trilogy, contains over thirty separate references to 
(and combinations of) the titular protagonist‟s „Zerstreuung‟, „Ablenkung‟, „Unruhe‟, 
„Unterhaltung‟, „Abschweifungsphantasie‟, „Abwechslung‟ and distracted sensations for 
which no single term suffices.18  One incident, early in the middle volume, encapsulates 
Abschaffel‟s condition as a modern man who is too readily distracted by the potential 
significance of even the most banal objects to be able either to handle calmly his dual 
confinements at home and in his office job or to maintain an equilibrium between these 
settings and his meanderings through a relatively small part of the outside world.  This 
incident also serves as a blueprint for the distracting „Kleinigkeiten‟ that Genazino‟s 
protagonists frequently magnify in his subsequent novelistic publications to date: 
„Abschaffel bewegte sich von einem ungeklärten Vorgang zum nächsten, ohne etwas 
erledigen zu können‟ (Abschaffel, p. 168).  On returning home one evening to the silence 
and solitude that he has managed to evade all day, Abschaffel is distracted by the sight on 
his balcony of a cardboard box, repeatedly soaked by rain, in which he had brought home 
his shopping several weeks earlier, but which he has still not bothered to dispose of: „so 
präzise wollte er sich mit dem Alltag nicht einlassen.  Das hätte ja ausgesehen, als wäre er 
eine Mann, der an seinem Feierabend einen leeren Karton in einen Mülleimer wirft‟ (ibid.).  
Distraction for Abschaffel here is fourfold.  First, he seeks distraction (in the sense of 
Ablenkung) from the notion of anyone else noticing how mundane his life is; thus, he 
leaves the box – itself an emblem of mundaneness – on his balcony as a second 
incidence of distraction (Zerstreuung), this time from the act of putting it in the dustbin, 
which both he and his assumed observers would find tedious.  Furthermore, the box 
                                            
18
 Genazino, Abschaffel (Roman-Trilogie: Abschaffel [1977], Die Vernichtung der Sorgen [1978], Falsche 
Jahre [1979]). Munich: DTV, 2002.  Cf. the contemporary French novelist of everyday absurdities Jean-
Philippe Toussaint‟s frequent descriptions of his protagonists responding „distraitement‟ in certain of his 
comparably introspective but more markedly ludic and minimalist narratives (at least five times in La 
Réticence [Paris: Minuit, 1991]; and at least fifteen times in La Télévision [Minuit, 1997]).  As Roy C. Caldwell 
points out, Toussaint‟s characters – like Genazino‟s – operate in „a simulation of life‟, „a level of abstraction‟, 
in order to „flee the pain, the wounds, the aggression of existence‟ (Caldwell, „Jean-Philippe Toussaint‟, in 
William Thompson, ed., The Contemporary Novel In France. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1995, 
pp. 369-381 [p. 381]).  
 10 
functions as a distraction from the unchanging familiarity of his indoor furnishings: thoughts 
of the wind dislodging the box and the rain saturating it unsettle Abschaffel, arousing 
Unruhe.  Finally, in shifting his gaze so soon after coming indoors away from his furniture 
to an awkwardly placed object outside, Abschaffel proves himself a devotee of a mode of 
behaviour that Franz Kafka has termed „Zerstreutes Hinausschaun‟: looking through a 
window in anticipation of flux outside to counter an intolerably tedious sense of immobility 
indoors.  Even as simple and worthless an item as a cardboard box shifts Abschaffel‟s 
attention away from boredom and towards the demarcation of absurdity in everyday life – 
but in privileging such objects, Abschaffel draws attention to the lack of enrichment that he 
is able to execute in his constricted existence.  This enrichment is brought about for others 
either by distractions within Pascal‟s range of „play and the society of women, war, and 
high posts‟ (although Pascal argues that these do not make us truly happy; Pensée 139), 
or by absorption in the modern mass media, or by „Zerstreutes Hinausschauen‟ as 
recorded by Kafka, when he presses his cheek „an die Klinke des Fensters‟, through which 
light and life populate the contrasting shades and tones that offer variety when indoors 
only dull uniformity is encountered:  
Unten sieht man das Licht der freilich schon sinkenden Sonne auf dem Gesicht des 
kindlichen Mädchens, das so geht und sich umschaut, und zugleich sieht man den 
Schatten des Mannes darauf, der hinter ihm rascher kommt. 
 
Dann ist der Mann schon vorübergegangen und das Gesicht des Kindes ist ganz 
hell.19 
 
 
Kafka‟s window concretises the visual mediation of distraction.  The window as a 
projection surface prefigures the cinema screen and the television in regulating our view of 
                                            
19
 Kafka, „Zerstreutes Hinausschaun‟, in Die Verwandlung und andere Erzählungen (Cologne: Könemann, 
1995), p.20.   This 87-word vignette was one of Kafka‟s earliest publications, composed in 1907 and taking a 
motif he had already established in the similarly short piece „Das Gassenfenster‟ (1906), which he was to 
develop in several of the other components of his first collection Betrachtung (1913).  For more details, see 
Hartmut Binder, Kafka-Kommentar zu sämtlichen Erzählungen (Munich: Winkler, 1975).  „Zerstreuung‟ is 
prominent elsewhere in Kafka‟s œuvre: incidences in his novels – albeit without explicit reference to this 
signifier – can be extrapolated from Stanley Corngold‟s commentary, „Franz Kafka: the radical modernist‟, in 
Graham Bartram, ed., The Modern German Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 62-
76, especially pp. 64-67).  In particular, Karl Rossmann‟s „rapture of distraction‟ in Der Verschollene  [written 
1912-14] is compared to the „“indifferentism” cultivated by modern painters like Francis Bacon and Dan 
Ching‟, rather than to any „doctrine of epiphanies‟ (Corngold, p. 64).  Also, both in this novel and in Das 
Schloß [written 1922], Zerstreuung is deployed as a narrative strategy in the interlinking of stories narrated 
by their characters, which „has the effect of dispersing the authority of the narrator and making the novel, to a 
radical degree, an affair of co-constitution between author and reader‟ (ibid., p. 66f.). Kafka‟s references to 
other signifiers of distraction should also be scrutinised: in one particularly notable aphorism he regards life 
itself as an unfathomable diversion: „Das Leben ist eine fortwährende Ablenkung, die nicht einmal zur 
Besinnung darüber kommen läßt, wovon sie ablenkt‟ („Fragmente aus Heften und losen Blättern‟, in 
Hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem Lande und andere Prosa aus seinem Nachlaß.  Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer, 1983, p. 242).    
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stimuli that gain proximity the more we are drawn towards them.  Prior to acknowledging 
the seminal status of Kafka‟s vignette, Lutz Koepnick highlights the effects of windows on 
both controlling and releasing the viewer‟s impulses to be distracted: „As they frame and 
reframe different perspectives onto the world, they also restructure the viewer‟s attention, 
regulate his or her perceptual distraction, or manage our desire simply to drift into the 
unknown and seemingly unfettered‟.20  This effect is emphatically dis-traction, as the 
viewer‟s physical motion is restricted by the window as a boundary, which also separates 
the viewer from the movements it reveals outside.  The window enables the internalisation 
of exterior alterity: in combination with the agency of the imagination, it represents, in 
Michael Braun‟s words, „a threshold to the objective world and to the human mind.  The 
German-Jewish writer from Prague was certainly well aware of the approximately 
homonym Hebrew words for window (chalon) and dream (chalom)‟.21 
   
Genazino‟s and Kafka‟s applications of Zerstreuung converge in their method of 
prospecting from a confined interior and stimulating the dispersal of their thoughts away 
from self-absorption.  Both methods involve confronting another space separate from the 
viewer‟s own, its border demarcated by the window.  Through this window, both viewers 
take in different dimensions of what they see, which is invariably subject to motion – 
changes of light and weather conditions in the case of Abschaffel‟s box; movements along 
the street in the case of Kafka‟s outdoor figures.  The prism of the window modulates the 
viewer‟s sense of proximity or distance in the passage between internal and external 
spaces; between the singularity of selfhood and the compound alterity of Zerstreuung.  
Dispersal and compounding are essential criteria for our understanding of Zerstreuung, the 
term that I shall now scrutinise. 
 
Approaches to Zerstreuung: Dispersal and Dissemination 
 
Despite the shared etymology of the English and German terms, to consider Zerstreuung 
as unqualified distraction would detract from its breadth of signification.  In the digital age, 
certain leading commentators have begun to prominently emphasise the magnitude of 
Zerstreuung beyond its arbitrary translation as distraction and its integration in (post-
)modern mass culture.  Far from Pascal‟s negative context of distraction, Samuel Weber 
                                            
20
 Koepnick, Framing Attention: Windows On Modern German Culture.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2007, p.1. 
21
 Braun, „Rooms with a View?: Kafka‟s “Fensterblicke”‟, German Studies Review, 15:1 (February 1992), 11-
23 (p. 3). 
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identifies Zerstreuung as a „feature‟ of both production and reception in cinema.22  Weber 
finds that „the literal resources of the German word, and hence its connotations, are far 
richer than the essentially privative terms “distraction” and [the occasional alternative 
translation] “absentminded” might lead one to believe‟ (ibid.).  Moreover, the term‟s history 
in German philosophy „demonstrates that its significance can in no way be encompassed 
by the concept of “distraction”, however important that notion undoubtedly is‟.  Zerstreuung 
is better understood, following a term Weber associates with Martin Heidegger, but which 
also features in Siegfried Kracauer‟s key essay „Kult der Zerstreuung‟, as Mannigfaltung, 
or manifolding.  Manfred Schneider surveys the usage of Zerstreuung more extensively, 
opening his study with a vigorous account of its potency: „Lange bevor sich das Böse in 
Gestalt von Dämonen und gefallenen Engeln in die Welt stürzte, trug es bereits einen 
Namen: Zerstreuung. [. . .] Alle abendlandischen Meisterdenker, Juristen, Theologen, 
Philosophen und Pädagogen, vereinen ihre Stimme im Fluch auf die Übermacht der 
Zerstreuung.  Von Platon über Augustinus, Luther, Kant, Goethe, Hegel bis hin zu Adorno 
und Heidegger windet sich diese Kette der vom Horror geschüttelten Geistesgrößen‟.23  
Nevertheless, Schneider distinguishes the ubiquitous Walter Benjamin as the first to find 
Zerstreuung encouraging rather than a negative phenomenon: „vielleicht als erster 
anspruchsvoller Denker hat Walter Benjamin der Zerstreuung mehr abgewonnen als nur 
den Ekel‟ (ibid).  Schneider thus, unfortunately, does not promote the significant treatment 
of Zerstreuung in relation to the evolution of popular entertainment prior to or 
contemporaneously with Benjamin as shaping the term‟s meaning constructively.   
 
The impact of Zerstreuung on German Enlightenment thought is especially remarkable.  
Immanuel Kant treats the concept in some detail in his Anthropologie of 1798, but without 
discernible regard for a century of cultural references to the distracted character that 
represent a confluence of intellectual self-awareness, social role demarcation and artistic 
                                            
22
 Samuel Weber, „Mass Mediauras: or, Art, Aura, and Media in the Work of Walter Benjamin‟, in David S. 
Ferris, ed., Walter Benjamin: Theoretical Questions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, pp. 27-49 [p. 
39]).  Weber takes Martin Heidegger‟s ontological use of Zerstreuung in both Sein und Zeit and the related 
lectures („Das Problem von Sein und Zeit‟, § 10 of Die Metaphysik des Satzes vom Grunde, in Heidegger, 
Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 26 [Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1990, p. 173ff.]) as his cue for reappraising 
Walter Benjamin‟s use of the term, and he acknowledges Jacques Derrida‟s „extremely suggestive‟ treatment 
of Heidegger‟s association of Zerstreuung with Dasein. 
23
 Manfred Schneider, „Kollekten des Geistes: Die Zerstreuung im Visier der Kulturkritik‟, Neue Rundschau 
110:2 (1999), pp. 44-55 (p. 44).  Schneider‟s previous work on autobiography prefigures his skilful 
contribution here in submitting such a complicated signifier as Zerstreuung to an intense scrutiny that 
resonates with the aims of my project.  His monograph Die erkaltete Herzensschrift: Der autobiographische 
Text im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: Hanser, 1986) was one of the first in German to analyse Michel Leiris‟s 
autobiographical project; he identifies Leiris‟s operation of three semiological systems in L’Age d’Homme, 
including the astrological – which tessellates with the cosmological sense of Zerstreuung – alongside 
physiognomical and psychological dimensions (Schneider, Herzensschrift, p. 38).   
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stylisation.  More recently, German and Anglophone cultural studies have tended to 
overlook the currency of Zerstreuung in the long 18th century, perhaps because of its 
origins in French work.  We must turn to the German Romance scholar Patricia Oster for 
analysis of how, triggered by Pascal, „die komplexe und widersprüchliche Natur des 
dezentrierten Ich bringt Strategien des Bewußtseins hervor, die sich der Konzentration mit 
Ablenkung und Zerstreutheit widersetzen‟, principally in French Classical drama.24  She 
highlights the iconic status of La Bruyère‟s characterisation of distraction in Les Caractères 
ou les mœurs de ce siècle (1688), which contains „eine ganze Folge komischer 
Pantomimen der Zerstreutheit‟, most obviously, but not solely, in the „Denkmal‟ figure of 
Ménalque, known as „Le Distrait‟.  Ménalque is not merely a character: „vielmehr entwirft er 
eine Vielzahl von Situationen, in denen die moderne Sozialisation den Menschen in einen 
Kampf mit den “tausend äußeren Dingen” verstrickt, die das Ich dezentrieren‟ (Oster, p. 
273).25  This distracted figure became more pronounced in Jean-François Regnard‟s 
staging of Le Distrait (1697), and the signification of „die Unverfügbarkeit des Bewußtseins‟ 
became both dispersed beyond the topoi of love and learning26 and focal to the portrayal 
of Léandre, the protagonist.   
 
When Regnard‟s comedy was brought to the German stage and tongue seventy years 
later, the comic potential signified in its title was problematised by Lessing, following its 
performance in Hamburg as Der Zerstreute: „Ich glaube schwerlich, daß unsere Großväter 
den deutschen Titel dieses Stücks verstanden hätten. Noch Schlegel übersetzte Distrait 
durch Träumer. Zerstreut sein, ein Zerstreuter, ist lediglich nach der Analogie des 
Französischen gemacht. Wir wollen nicht untersuchen, wer das Recht hatte, diese Worte 
zu machen; sondern wir wollen sie brauchen, nachdem sie einmal gemacht sind. Man 
versteht sie nunmehr, und das ist genug‟.27 J. G. Robertson notes that A.W. Schlegel was 
unimpressed by the figure of the Träumer; and Johann Adolf Scheibe supplemented Der 
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 Oster, „Das dezentrierte Ich.  Phänomenologie der Zerstreutheit im Siècle Classique‟, in Aleida and Jan 
Assmann, eds., Aufmerksamkeiten.  Munich: Fink, 2001, pp. 265-285 (p. 270). 
25
 A further dimension of the „distrait‟ character in French has been surveyed by Philippe Roger in „The 
Distracted Womanizer‟ (trans. Bettina Lerner, Yale French Studies, 94 [1998], 163-178): his focus is on 
libertinage in Les amours du chevalier de Faublas [1787-1790] by Jean-Baptiste Louvet de Couvray, whose 
protagonist is not distinguished by an individual character trait like the other male figures but as a „distracted 
hero‟, who „uses the word “distraction” as a euphemism to define his unique rapport with the rest of the 
world, or more specifically, his relationship to women‟, who appear to him in concentrations (Roger, p. 164f.).  
26
 Cf. Gadi Algazi, op. cit., who alludes to the „kulturell tradierten Bild‟ evolving from the late Middle Ages of 
„Geistesabwesenheit‟ in the „Gelehrtenhabitus‟, which manifests itself in „gelehrte Vergeßlichkeit und 
Zerstreutheit‟ (p. 242).  
27
 Lessing, „Achtundzwanzigstes Stück, Den 4. August 1767‟, in Hamburgische Dramaturgie. Teddington: 
Echo Library, 2006, p. 103. 
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Zerstreute with „Unschlüssige [Unentschlüssige]‟.28  Zerstreuung is key to Lessing‟s value 
judgements on comedy in the Hamburgische Dramaturgie: he believes that „Die Komödie 
will durch Lachen bessern; aber nicht eben durch Verlachen‟; for example, „Wer aber von 
Natur zerstreut sei, der lasse sich durch Spöttereien eben so wenig bessern, als ein 
Hinkender‟ (Lessing, Hamburgische, p. 104).  While Robertson dismisses Lessing‟s 
remarks as being insubstantial and unoriginal paraphrases of French sources,29 they are 
notable in the semantic evolution of distraction in German literature and performance, as 
well as in highlighting the dichotomy of Zerstreuung and Aufmerksamkeit: „Sind wir nicht 
Meister unserer Aufmerksamkeit?  Und was ist die Zerstreuung anders, als ein unrechter 
Gebrauch unserer Aufmerksamkeit?‟ (ibid.)  Thus, Lessing subordinates distraction as a 
suspect activity that undermines our mastery of attention.  He falls short of designating 
attention as a „Gegenbegriff‟ to distraction in the emphatic manner of Oster, who asserts 
that „Aufmerksamkeit und Zerstreutheit bedingen sich gegenseitig.  Von Zerstreutheit 
spricht man, wenn es unmöglich ist, die Aufmerksamkeit auf einen bestimmten 
Gegenstand zu konzentrieren, oder aber umgekehrt, wenn sich die ganze Aufmerksamkeit 
auf erscheint‟.30 Oster‟s definition takes for granted the operation of the two concepts of 
attention and distraction in the same sphere.  Attention occupies no more constant a 
position than distraction; both are states of in-betweenness.  Geoffrey Hartman, in 
„Scattered Thoughts on Aufmerksamkeit/ Zerstreute Gedanken über Aufmerksamkeit‟, a 
contribution to the same collection of studies of forms of attention, nods not only to the 
digressive essay format of eighteenth-century German writers such as Lessing but also to 
the arbitrariness of fixing attention, which is situated between the boundaries of “looking 
for” and “waiting for”.31  What is more, ‟zerstreute Anmerkungen‟ are not necessarily 
presented in a scattered form but are typically gathered together in a collection of some 
kind that comes closer to approximating the state of Sammlung to which Zerstreuung has 
been opposed than to conveying utter randomness.  A double irony is to be detected in 
one of the glossary entries for Kant‟s Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798) by 
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 J. G. Robertson, Lessing’s Dramatic Theory.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939, p. 192. 
29
 Robertson identifies the French theatre and music historian François Parfaict (1698-1753) as „Lessing‟s 
source of information concerning Der Zerstreute‟ (Robertson, p. 191). The analogy of the limping man 
(Hinkender/boiteux) is lifted from a citation by the Frères Parfaict from the Lettres d’un François of the Abbé 
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 Oster, p. 265; she takes as her starting point a historical survey of Zerstreutheit by the linguist Eugen 
Lerch.   
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 Hartman in Assmann and Assmann, eds., op. cit., pp. 129-139 (p. 129). Cf. James M. Van Der Laan, „The 
German Essay of the 18
th
 Century: Mirror of its Age‟, in Richard E. Schade, ed., Lessing Yearbook, Vol. 18. 
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1986, pp. 179-196, who cites Klopstock‟s reference in „Gedanken 
über die Natur der Poesie‟ [1759] to „a loose combination of ideas, “zerstreute Gedanken”‟ as typifying this 
mode of writing also practised by Lessing, most explicitly in „Zerstreute Gedanken über das Epigramm‟ 
[1771]. 
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Reinhard Brandt, which rounds up prominent uses of the term that resonate with the work 
of philosophy.  On the one hand, this collation of a scattering of sources serves to edify the 
reader who might otherwise be fixed on Kant‟s renderings of Zerstreuung without 
appreciating their connectedness to other instances – including to the dynamic of 
„zerstreute Anmerkungen‟:   
Der Zerstreuer war der Titel einer Zeitschrift Samuel Christian Hollmanns in 
Göttingen (1737). – [Werner] Leibbrand und [Annemarie] Wettley [, Der Wahnsinn: 
Geschichte der abendländischen Psychopathologie.  Freiburg: Alber,]1961, 364: 
"Die Zerstreuung (distractio), jenes etwa seit Lessing neu aufgekommene Wort, das 
in engstem Zusammenhang mit dem „Collectum‟ der Pietisten steht, [...]". Bei Kant 
wird ebenfalls der Gegensatz der "collectio animi" erwähnt ([Anthropologie, p. 
]207,[l.]20 mit Kommentar).32 
 
Is this (or, indeed, any) gloss an instrument of focusing attention on a concept pieced 
together from a broader historical context than the primary text explicitly acknowledges?  
Or is the gloss an agent of distraction, drawing apart the epistemological unity of a signifier 
as treated by one author and manifolding its treatments across a range of discourses by 
others?  On the other hand, the first usage noted by Brandt aptly sums up the innate 
dichotomy conveyed by Zerstreuung: Hollmann‟s periodical binds together pieces of 
writing, yet its title pays homage to the act of dispersing them.  Zerstreuung here, as in the 
references made by Leibbrand and Wetley and Kant, stands for spatialisation as a 
counter-movement to the constriction of the collective. 
  
Brandt highlights the dispersion of Kant‟s usage of Zerstreuung (distractio), commencing 
with its cosmological origins: „In den Frühschriften ist "Zerstreuung" der terminus technicus 
für den Zustand der Materie im unendlichen Raum vor der Stern- und Planetenbildung‟ 
(Brandt, p. 293).  Over the course of Kant‟s œuvre, however, Zerstreuung gained 
psychological and epistemological signification.  Brandt‟s commentary discerns how 
distraction in Kant‟s Anthropologie occurs at three points in the constellation of human 
development. Firstly, it is to be found „im Hinblick auf die Kindheit des Menschen‟; Brandt 
alludes to the end of the first paragraph of the Anthropologie, where Kant‟s perspectives of 
both the selectivity of adult memory and the incompleteness of object-conception in 
childhood coincide to emphasise dispersion: „Die Erinnerung seiner Kinderjahre reicht aber 
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 Reinhard Brandt, Kritischer Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (Kant 
Forschungen, Vol. 10). Hamburg: Meiner, 1999, p. 294 <http://web.uni-
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bei weitem nicht an jene Zeit, weil sie nicht die Zeit der Erfahrungen, sondern blos 
zerstreuter, unter den Begriff des Objects noch nicht vereinigter Wahrnehmungen war.‟ 
(Kant, Anthropologie, p. 128).  Secondly, Zerstreuung may represent „den zufälligen 
momentanen Geisteszustand des normalen Erwachsenen‟ (Brandt, p. 294).  Thirdly, and 
most troublingly, Zerstreuung describes „den habituellen, schon leicht pathologischen 
Zustand geistig gefährdeter Menschen‟ (ibid.).  With this nuance, Kant‟s sense of 
Zerstreuung incorporates in its advanced stages an element of Verstörung; however, the 
extent and focus of habituation vary, and we need to tease apart Kant‟s condensed 
presentations of distraction to appreciate how different strands have been taken up by 
subsequent commentators. 
Kant is concerned with the system of consciousness within which both attention and 
distraction operate: it follows, I would contend, that if distraction is attention reconfigured, 
focused attention would, confusingly, be considered a reconfiguration of scattered 
Zerstreuung.  Fortunately, the English signifier awareness is at our disposal to mediate 
between consciousness and attention; and a body of Anglophone scholarship in 
psychology strengthens my case for distinguishing, as Kant does in his Anthropologie, the 
configurations of awareness that become manifested as forms of either attention or 
distraction, and which are thus pertinent to Zerstreuung.33  Chris Nunn, while 
acknowledging that consciousness and awareness are broadly synonymous in everyday 
usage, makes two key distinctions between these two terms.  On the one hand, 
'consciousness is always about something': it has developed connotations in philosophy 
(for instance, of intentionality and emotionality) that relate to definable sensations.  
Awareness, on the other hand, is a 'basic phenomenon', which may be more abstract, and 
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 Cf. the „Conventional theoretical framework‟ offered by William A. Johnston and David L. Strayer in „A 
Dynamic, Evolutionary Perspective on Attention Capture‟:  „Processing of external stimuli is typically divided 
into preattentional and postattentional stages.  Awareness or consciousness is associated with 
postattentional processing.  Because postattentional processing (a.k.a. awareness) is assumed to be limited 
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Perspectives on Attentional Capture. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001, pp. 375-398 [p. 376]; my emphasis).  
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58), but the auditory and visual modes by which information is transmitted and captured differ.  Johnson and 
Proctor note that we compensate for 'the inability to move the ear to catch wanted sounds in the way that the 
eyes can be moved to catch wanted sights' by "tuning" sensory receptors in the cochlea to favour one sound 
over another, thus mitigating distraction (p. 104).     
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exists beyond the concretions of consciousness.34  Awareness 'lights up, so to speak, 
things like the idea of myself, my feelings at the moment and so forth.  Although people 
have some idea of “I” almost constantly present either somewhere in the background or, 
more often, well to the forefront of their consciousness, the pure awareness described by 
Zen masters and very occasionally experienced by many people does exist.  All sense of 
person and other common attributes of consciousness are lost when in such a state, but 
awareness remains' (ibid.).  Nunn also clarifies the relationship between awareness and 
attention: 'attention is just another brain function that can be shown to have localised 
manifestations (mainly in the frontal lobes) which may or may not enter awareness‟ (ibid., 
p. 27).  The prominence of attention as an object of study over awareness is 
understandable, given that 'although [attention] forms part of the ordinary stream of 
awareness, it appears to exist in a different time-frame and to have a controlling role' (ibid., 
p. 99).  
Attributing abstraction to either distraction or attention in mutually exclusive terms poses a 
particular problem. Reinhard Brandt‟s commentary emphasises how abstraction for Kant is 
not consistently coterminous with Zerstreuung, despite this latter term being defined in the 
Anthropologie as „der Zustand einer Abkehrung der Aufmerksamkeit (abstractio)‟ 
(Anthropologie, p. 206).  Elsewhere, abstraction appears better opposed to 
Aufmerksamkeit than distraction: „Die "abstractio" wird sonst durchaus nicht als 
Zerstreuung, sondern als Komplementärstück der Aufmerksamkeit gefaßt, vgl. 
[Anthropologie, p. ]131,[ll.]16-18 mit Kommentar. Man möchte also just hier von einer 
Zerstreuung des Autors sprechen und muß statt "abstractio", bezogen auf die Abkehr, 
"attentio", bezogen auf die Aufmerksamkeit selbst, in die Klammer setzen‟ (Brandt, p. 
294).  Distraction is thus a condition of consciousness, rather than of attention, as 
Rodolphe Gasché points out:  „Empirical consciousness is not only diverse and distracted 
in the different representations that it may accompany, it is distracted in itself, and thus in 
no situation authoritatively to secure self-coherence or self-identity‟.35  
Kant draws a further distinction, between abstractio as voluntary Zerstreuung, which he 
terms „Dissipation‟, and involuntary Zerstreuung, which he names „Abwesenheit (absentia) 
von sich selbst‟ (Anthropologie p. 206).  Gasché identifies the kinds of Zerstreuung 
identified by Walter Benjamin in film and architecture as falling into this latter category 
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 Nunn, Awareness: What It Is, What It Does.  London: Routledge, 1996, p. 1. 
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(Gasché, p. 199); but neither Gasché nor Benjamin projects absentia into the realm of 
mental illness – the territory demarcated by Verstörtheit – to the extent that Kant does 
within the same passage of the Anthropologie.   The interplay of concentration and 
distraction is problematical even when a thinker is deemed to be in control of his mind, as 
the memory researcher Hermann Ebbinghaus acknowledged in his Grundzüge der 
Psychologie at the start of the twentieth century: „Wie schwer ist es, ein und denselben 
Gedanken längere Zeit festzuhalten! Man will sich ganz in ihn versenken, nichts anderes 
neben ihm aufkommen lassen. Aber nicht allzulange später, während die äußeren 
Anzeichen energischer Konzentration, eine bestimmte Kopf- und Augenhaltung, 
zusammengekniffene Lippen u.s.w. ruhig fortbestehen, ertappt man sich plötzlich darüber, 
daß man an etwas ganz anderes denkt, und wird sich deutlich bewußt, daß der 
festzuhaltende Gedanke, statt inzwischen zu beharren, soeben gerade aufs neue 
auftaucht.‟36  For Kant, however, our inability to expel Zerstreuung from a concentrated 
mind is a fundamental weakness that can lead to madness, not because of any loss of 
focus on this „festzuhaltende Gedanke‟, but rather when an inability to become „deutlich 
bewußt‟ of any new thoughts – and thus an inability to enact a further level of abstractio – 
results: 
Es ist eine von den Gemüthsschwächen, durch die reproductive Einbildungskraft an 
eine Vorstellung, auf welche man große oder anhaltende Aufmerksamkeit verwandt 
hat, geheftet zu sein und von ihr nicht abkommen, d. i. den Lauf der 
Einbildungskraft wiederum frei machen zu können. Wenn dieses Übel habituell und 
auf einen und denselben Gegenstand gerichtet wird, so kann es in Wahnsinn 
ausschlagen. (Anthropologie pp. 206-7.)   
 
In this instance, Kant implies that protracted Zerstreuung involves a loss of control over 
one's self-awareness – that is, until or unless momentary self-awareness of the kind 
described by Ebbinghaus, which amounts to Kant and Brandt's 'zufälligen momentanen 
Geisteszustand des normalen Erwachsenen' (op. cit.), creates a further but temporary 
distraction.37   
 
For Kant, the social impact of Zerstreuung is negative: 'In Gesellschaft zerstreut zu sein, 
ist unhöflich, oft auch lächerlich' (Anthropologie, p. 207). Zerstreuung amounts to deviance 
from conforming to a public role for those of limited social standing, represented by crudely 
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stereotyped women and waiters: 'Das Frauenzimmer ist dieser Anwandlung gewöhnlich 
nicht unterworfen; sie müßten denn sich mit Gelehrsamkeit abgeben. Ein Bedienter, der in 
seiner Aufwartung bei Tische zerstreut ist, hat gemeiniglich etwas Arges, entweder was er 
vorhat, oder wovon er die Folge besorgt, im Kopfe‟ (ibid.).  In both these cases, the 
enactment of private thoughts of Zerstreuung is considered a public danger.  On the other 
hand, however, distraction is necessary for those in positions of power as a way of 
regaining control of their minds; it symbolises their authority to concern themselves with 
more than the concentratedness of their public duties.  Kant‟s exemplar of the preacher 
who keeps his sermon apart from his usual cognitive activities38 opeates as a conduit to a 
broader advocation of the remedial and regenerative force of social discourse:  
 
Aber sich zu zerstreuen, d. i. seiner unwillkürlich reproductiven Einbildungskraft 
eine Diversion machen, z. B. wenn der Geistliche seine memorirte Predigt gehalten 
und das Nachrumoren im Kopf verhindern will, dies ist ein nothwendiges, zum Theil 
auch künstliches Verfahren der Vorsorge für die Gesundheit seines Gemüths. Ein 
anhaltendes Nachdenken über einen und denselben Gegenstand läßt gleichsam 
einen Nachklang zurück, der (wie eben dieselbe Musik zu einem Tanze, wenn sie 
lange fortdauert, dem von der Lustbarkeit Zurückkehrenden noch immer 
nachsummt, oder wie Kinder ein und dasselbe bon mot von ihrer Art, vornehmlich 
wenn es rhythmisch klingt, unaufhörlich wiederholen) - der, sage ich, den Kopf 
belästigt und nur durch Zerstreuung und Verwendung der Aufmerksamkeit auf 
andere Gegenstände, z. B. Lesung der Zeitungen, gehoben werden kann. - Das 
sich Wiedersammeln (collectio animi), um zu jeder neuen Beschäftigung bereit zu 
sein, ist eine die Gesundheit des Gemüths befördernde Herstellung des 
Gleichgewichts seiner Seelenkräfte. (Ibid.) 
Kant‟s dichotomy of popular music, considered repetitive, simple and harmfully distracting, 
and the press, substantial and edifying, nowadays appears false due to the technological 
evolution of both of these media.  We shall shortly observe how comparable sentiments 
about mid-twentieth century popular music have been expressed by Theodor Adorno; but 
Kant‟s less politically-charged observation here holds enduring intergeneric value.  He 
compares a person distracted by music to a child captivated by the novelty of a new sound 
that it emphatically seeks to assimilate through constant repetition.39  Such a child-like 
respondent to music, or to any other replicable mediated stimulus, passes distraction on in 
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turn to the discerning critic, who fears that the repeater of the offending sounds or words 
may lack awareness of the effects of repetition in general, which include the manipulation 
of distraction on an audience, a point which Adorno was to take up. 
In his praise of the discourse provided by newspapers, dispersed across the printed pages 
and further disseminated by discussions between their readers, Kant does not posit the 
press as the source of instant gratification that it was to become after it embraced 
photography. A century later, competing newspapers would exploit distraction boldly (not 
least in typographical terms) by encapsulating the most resonant elements of their stories 
in visually seductive headlines, captions and images that would capture the largest of 
readerships and provoke responses in emotional rather than critical terms.  In Kant‟s time, 
when newspaper reading was still a relatively cerebral pastime for educated men, another 
form of writing held a comparable mass appeal for the uncritical female reader: the novel.  
As Brandt notes, Kant‟s categorisation of Zerstreuung as habitual and pathological afflicts 
„geistig gefährdeter Menschen, unter denen sich die Romanleserinnen besonders 
auszeichnen‟ (Brandt, p. 294).  Its main symptom is „Vergeßlichkeit (obliviositas)‟, which 
Kant equates with obliviousness to serving the world: 
oft ist es [. . .] die Wirkung einer habituellen Zerstreuung, welche vornehmlich die 
Romanleserinnen anzuwandeln pflegt.  Denn weil bei dieser Leserei die Absicht nur 
ist, sich für den Augenblick zu unterhalten, indem man weiß, daß es bloße 
Erdichtungen sind, die Leserin hier also volle Freiheit hat, im Lesen nach dem 
Laufe ihrer Einbildungskraft zu dichten, welches natürlicherweise zerstreut und die 
Geistesabwesenheit (Mangel der Aufmerksamkeit auf das Gegenwärtige) habituell 
macht: so muß das Gedächtniß dadurch unvermeidlich geschwächt werden. – 
Diese Übung in der Kunst die Zeit zu tödten und sich für die Welt unnütz zu 
machen, hintennach aber doch über die Kürze des Lebens zu klagen, ist 
abgesehen von der phantastischen Gemüthsstimmung, welche sie hervorbringt, 
einer der feindseligsten Angriffe aufs Gedächtniß. (Anthropologie, p. 185.) 
 
Later, alluding to the activity of „Romanlesen‟ rather than to the gender of the readership, 
Kant diagnoses the resulting problem of distraction as „habituell‟: 
Denn ob es gleich durch Zeichnung von Charakteren, die sich wirklich unter 
Menschen auffinden lassen (wenn gleich mit einiger Übertreibung), den Gedanken 
einen Zusammenhang als in einer wahren Geschichte giebt, deren Vortrag immer 
auf gewisse Weise systematisch sein muß, so erlaubt es doch zugleich dem 
Gemüth, während dem Lesen Abschweifungen (nämlich noch andere 
Begebenheiten als Erdichtungen) mit einzuschieben, und der Gedankengang wird 
fragmentarisch, so daß man die Vorstellungen eines und desselben Objects 
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zerstreut (sparsim), nicht verbunden (conjunctim) nach Verstandeseinheit im 
Gemüthe spielen läßt. (Ibid., p. 208.) 
 
Kant‟s assumptions here that character sketches in prose fiction are „systematisch‟ – 
coherent and linear – and that these represent a „Verstandeseinheit‟ have been challenged 
as the novel has evolved.  Why should we nowadays assume that a writer‟s behaviour is 
any less restrained than a reader‟s in privileging digressions in the narrative?  The problem 
of distraction from „die Vorstellungen eines und desselben Objects‟, where that object is 
the life of a protagonist, is fundamental to writing.  Paul Ricœur has noted in the context of 
autobiography the duality of narrative identity, formed of the permanent idem on the one 
hand and the self-same, but potentially evolving ipse on the other, which need to be 
reconciled in a narrative if it is to be considered authentic.40  While Ricœur‟s concern is 
with acknowledging the interplay of change and permanence in the text, Kant is troubled 
more by the conflation of veracity and imagination that permeate the page and the reader‟s 
mind.  Niklas Luhmann notes that prior to Kant „it was already a common topos in critiques 
of novelistic reading matter that the division of real reality and fictional reality was not 
being maintained; but precisely this point was reflected again within the novel and was set 
up in contrast to an authentic relation to the world, as if it were not precisely thus that one 
ran the risk of advising the reader by means of such reading matter that he or she should 
endeavour to be authentic‟.41  Luhmann situates Kant‟s line of argument between the early 
form of the novel and the modern mass media, in order to exemplify how we can infer 
„unjust distribution‟ of reality in popular modes of entertainment.  Kant had in mind a 
tradition of „a literary genre which [a century before Kant] was called “romance” and was 
considerably different from what we have known as the novel since the eighteenth century 
– not least in its idealization of heroes and of situations under the conditions of “decorum” 
and “verisimilitude”‟ (Luhmann, p. 142, n.11).  More recently, with the omnipresence of 
multiple forms of media, representations of reality have been dispersed further, and the 
reader‟s or viewer‟s participation in the events presented has become even more of a 
distraction from his or her mere observation of their narration: „The difference of the inside 
and outside of fiction, the difference of a narrative or a film story on the one hand and an 
author, machinery of publication and receivers on the other, is undermined by a constant 
crossing of the boundary. [. . .] Communication today seems to be borne by visual 
knowledge no longer capable of being controlled subjectively, whose commonality owes 
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itself to the mass media and is carried along by their fashions‟ (ibid., p. 81f.).  
„Verstandeseinheit‟ nowadays stands for neither the „sparsim‟ nor the „conjunctim‟, but is 
contingent on the mediation of the various distractions that we consume often 
fragmentarily from the flow of multiple sources. 
 
Luhmann‟s juxtaposition of distracting reality constructions in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century novel-reading and in the manifoldings of contemporary media culture – where „the 
reshaping of everything and anything into a sign of culture [. . .] is at once product and alibi 
of the mass media‟ (ibid., p. 85) – might encourage us to overlook developments in 
distraction between Kant and the invention of the motion picture.  Zerstreuung, by its 
nature, from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries follows several courses.  In 
line with Kant‟s distinction of „Dissipation‟ from „Abwesenheit‟, John Armstrong has recently 
illuminated for English readers how Goethe portrays Werther‟s and Faust‟s very different 
pursuits of satisfaction as refusals of renunciation.  Werther is too distracted by his desire 
for Charlotte to find true happiness: „it is the compelling power of this fantasy – of this 
longed-for pleasure – which, in reality prevents him from enjoying anything‟.42  For Faust, 
however, as for Pascal, unhappiness is symbolised by confinement, despite the problems 
that ensue when he diverts himself: „Our appetites, our longing for possessions and for 
power, our desire to make things and impose our will: all of these are not surprisingly 
sources of trouble.  Yet without them we are like Faust in his room at the beginning – 
feeling that life is not worth it, that it would have been better never to have been born.  To 
sit, as Pascal suggests, quietly in one‟s room might be a way of avoiding trouble, but such 
a life could hardly be called good‟ (ibid., p. 419f.).  A further response to distraction is 
offered by Schiller, who acknowledges the need to disperse the perspectives presented in 
his classical dramas in order to satisfy the demands of increasingly informed audiences.  
At the same time, Schiller is at pains to ensure that „die Mannigfaltigkeit [. . .] nicht 
zerstreuen und der Einfachkeit des Ganzen keinen Abbruch tun [werde]‟; as Claudia 
Stockinger asserts, „daß eine idealisierende Verallgemeinung – strukturell gesehen, die 
klassizistisch motivierte Verdichtung – aufgrund der zunehmenden Einsicht in die 
Komplexität der Weltverhältnisse kaum mehr gelingen kann, verdeutlichen die 
Entstehungsgeschichten gerade der dramatischen Fragmente Schillers‟.43  Zerstreuung, 
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when tracked across responses to Schiller‟s dramatic work, however, has two meanings, 
the first of which renders it inseparable from manifolding.  Zerstreuung is, „zum einen, 
bezogen auf die poetische Praxis, ein Modernitätssignal, das die dramaturgischen 
Konsequenzen der gerade von Schiller immer wieder benannten neuen 
Unübersichtlichkeit anzeigt, zum anderen, bezogen auf die Rezeption, eine 
Verlustkategorie, vermittels derer die vielfältigen Formen der Ablenkung des 
Publikumsinteresses auf einen Nenner gebracht werden. Schillers Simplizitätsideal 
schließt eine Dramaturgie der Zerstreuung aus.‟ (Ibid.) 
 
The demands of readers and audiences continued to grow in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries as their attentiveness to characters, scenes and milieux expanded.  
Extensive research has recently been published on attention and distraction in the visual 
culture of this period,44 but more analysis needs to be devoted to the distinctions between 
European nations in the social and political conditions during the industrial revolution, 
which determined the chronology and constituency of innovations that paved the way for 
the broadly modern (and specifically Modernist) age.   
 
In 1890, the American William James dealt at length in his Principles of Psychology with 
attention.  Within his typology, he subsumes inattentiveness in the category of „passive 
intellectual attention‟: „When absorbed in intellectual attention we may become so 
inattentive to outer things as to be “absent-minded”, “abstracted” or “distraits.”  All revery 
or concentrated meditation is apt ot throw us into this state‟.45  However, while such 
distraction-as-Unaufmerksamkeit is classified as a mode of attention, distraction-as-
Zerstreutheit is kept emphatically apart.  The dichotomy is all the more striking as James 
uses this latter German signifier (and its French counterpart, distraction) to maximise the 
contrast of this ignominious state with the ubiquity of attention.  „Every one knows what 
attention is‟, he asserts: it stands for the act of attending to something, „and is a condition 
which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, scatterbrained state which in French is 
called distraction, and Zerstreutheit in German‟ (ibid., p. 404).  James‟s polarity has 
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become contentious in the digital age, as we habitually defer processes of “attending to”, 
and are supported in our immediate fragmentary activities by the latest technologies. 
David M. Levy speculates that „perhaps even more of a problem than the loss of 
attentional acuity is that we seem to have so little control over it; that we are often unable 
to summon it when we most want it or need it‟.46  Furthermore, „current computer screens 
may also promote patterns of attenuate, fragmented reading‟, prompting us to print out 
longer documents for future reference, while we remain beholden to the screen „for shorter 
bursts of reading as well as for reading which is highly interactive‟ (ibid., p. 208f.).  No 
wonder, thus, that in the evolution of the digital library only the first two of the three on-
screen processes of search, acquisition and reading have as yet been substantial subjects 
of research; reading increasingly represents an exclusion from attention, which, as William 
James saw it, „implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others‟ 
(James, p. 404).  Reading requires this level of withdrawal, or retreat, for which „the 
visually cluttered, multithreaded desktops on which we work„ (Levy, p. 209) are not 
conducive.  
 
Michael Hagner summarises the transformation from stable attention at the start of the 
nineteenth century to its dispersal brought about by technology at the start of the twentieth.  
Tellingly, he avoids referring to distraction in negative terms, preferring instead to 
demarcate a new kind of attention:  
Around 1800, attention made us the masters of exploring ourselves and the world 
that surrounds us. Around 1900, the space between ourselves and the world was 
filled by apparatuses, instruments, technologies and all sorts of entertainment. In 
this situation, the destabilization of attention became an auto-therapeutic device. 
First formulated within the realm of psychophysics, the notion of freefloating 
attention was transformed into a cultural cipher. The emergence and establishment 
of this new type of attention does not imply that the former one was out-of-date 
around 1900. On the contrary, both types were related to each other. The 
conservative critic Max Nordau based his critical judgment of fin-de-siècle culture 
on the claim that voluntary attention was a sign of sanity and of educated middle-
class order, whereas distraction, superficial and free-floating attention was a 
symptom of fatigue, degeneration and of an inhibited development of the nervous 
system.47  
 
Hagner does not specify who he means by „us‟ in this context of socio-cultural 
manifestations of attention. The pre-industrial or early industrial world that surrounded the 
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observer of 1800 was reshaped over the course of the next century, not only for residents 
of rapidly expanding towns and cities but also for travellers as transport networks were 
constructed.  Thus, the sense of „space between ourselves and the world‟ that Hagner 
believes to have persisted was reduced as well as filled.  The births of psychology and 
sociology and their attempts to situate the human subject in the world contributed to this 
reduction in space.  Further generalisations would be arbitrary without consideration of the 
geographical and political differences between the rates of industrial development and any 
concomitant evolution in intellectual and leisure pursuits in individual countries: Britain‟s 
industrial revolution began before those of its neighbours, for example, yet its secular 
university system only emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century, making any 
parallels with, say, Germany‟s growth superficial.  Nevertheless, by the end of that century 
throughout the western world, work and leisure spaces had diversified comparably; and 
these sites were occupied by newly proliferating and prolific middle classes.  
 
Sociological discussion of Zerstreuung as entertainment is prominent in Georg Simmel‟s 
analysis of leisure time, leisure habits and reconfigurations of consciousness among the 
increasing numbers of salaried workers in the German cities, in a study published in 1903, 
before the advent of cinema as a mass medium, but under the conditions in which it was to 
thrive two decades later.48  For Simmel (1858-1918), as David Harvey points out, ‟the 
social spaces of distraction and display become as vital to urban culture as the spaces of 
working and living‟.49 Settings that offer distraction are thus sources of attraction to 
consumers.  These locations exert a gravitational pull, an invitation to mass traction or 
locomotion.  Fashion, electric light, photography and, later, cinema represent Zerstreuung 
in terms of their diffusion as different sources offering different sensations.  Nevertheless, 
in their profusion in the cityscape, these sources of mass entertainment attain a powerful 
fusion through which their mass appeal is measured.  For Simmel, the city has become 
„eines jener großen historischen Gebilde, in denen sich die entgegengesetzten, das Leben 
umfassenden Strömungen wie zu gleichen Rechten zusammenfinden und entfalten‟ 
(Simmel, op. cit.).  „Distraction‟ here underscores the entertaining function of these 
streams,50 where Unterhaltung is a common synonym for Zerstreuung.  The individual‟s 
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shaping of experience has become subordinate to irresistible passive consumption by the 
masses: „das Leben wird ihr einerseits unendlich leicht gemacht, indem Anregungen, 
Interessen, Ausfüllungen von Zeit und Bewusstsein sich ihr von allen Seiten anbieten und 
sie wie in einem Strome tragen, in dem es kaum noch eigener Schwimmbewegungen 
bedarf‟ (ibid.).  „Distraction‟ does not convey the allure of such an easy life: instead, it 
polarises the sense of „attraction‟ that is attenuated where consumers follow fashion.  Not 
until Simmel‟s student Siegfried Kracauer (1889-1966) expanded the dynamics of 
Zerstreuung in a similar social context to his teacher could „distraction‟ be validated 
comprehensively in the (German) metropolis. 
 
One attempt in today‟s academy to validate the currency of „distraction‟ that centres on 
Kracauer is to be found in an overview of European cinema for Anglophone readers, which 
requires development if it is to hold value for scholars concerned with language and 
literature.  Ian Aitken asserts ambiguously that „the view of the modern condition as one 
characterised by fragmentation and ambiguity led directly to the emergence of the concept 
of “distraction” as a major critical concern of the [interwar] period.  This amounted to the 
theorisation of a new form of visual and sensory experience of the modern environment, 
one in which an unfocused “distracted” mode of understanding and consumption prevailed.  
This distracted form of experience inevitably led to an impoverished and “abstract” 
encounter with the self and the world, and further reinforced instrumental rationality.‟51 
While Aitken‟s suggestion of a singular theorisation bound up with a singular “distracted” 
mode is explicable within the parameters of his study of cinema, rather than in the cross-
disciplinary contexts of philosophy or cultural studies, it is harder to accept that distraction 
became a concern to film studies overall, or to the Frankfurt school with which Kracauer 
was associated, only between the wars as a direct result of contemporary views of the 
condition of life, given the volume and quality of writing on attention and distraction that 
had accrued since the Enlightenment.  Furthermore, Aitken misleadingly claims that 
distraction was „originally a negative term, defined in opposition to the contemplative forms 
of concentration and more unified modes of experience normally associated with the high 
arts‟ (ibid., p. 19), thus suggesting that distraction only started to be conceptualised 
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seriously when it was opposed to Versenkung and Sammlung by Benjamin and Adorno.  
Nevertheless, Aitken rightly acknowledges that „the notion of distraction eventually took on 
more positive and radical connotations during the 1920s, becoming identified with non-
bourgeois, or proletarian modes of experience, and with alternatives to totalising systems 
of rationality.‟  We must trace for ourselves how distraction has evolved and been 
disseminated in subsequent decades, as Aitken‟s assessment is stubbornly frozen in 
Kracauer‟s time.52  Not writing for language specialists, Aitken avoids alluding to the 
German Zerstreuung; rather, he oversimplifies the varying interoperability (or dialectic) of 
distraction as an outcome and as a process by directing us solely to Kracauer‟s iconic „Kult 
der Zerstreuung‟ essay, where distraction is „found‟ as „both the product of abstraction and 
the mode of cognition through which the mass public can understand and transform their 
own experiences‟ (ibid., p. 170). 
 
Kracauer, the author of the Frankfurter Zeitung cinema review articles „Kult der 
Zerstreuung‟ (4 March 1926), „Not und Zerstreuung‟ (16 July 1931), „Gepflegte 
Zerstreuung‟ (3 August 1931), and „Ablenkung und Aufbau‟ (27 & 28 July 1932), as well as 
of an extended study of Die Angestellten (1930), which was subtitled in its much later 
English translation Duty and Distraction in Weimar Germany,53 constantly emphasises the 
cultural embeddedness of Zerstreuung.  Once established in popular culture, cinema-
going, beyond the films themselves, became a totalising event: „Aus dem Kino ist ein 
glänzendes, revueartiges Gebilde herausgekrochen: das Gesamtkunstwerk der Effekte.  
Es entlädt sich vor sämtlichen Sinnen mit sämtlichen Mitteln‟.54  In his review of the film 
Nie Wieder Liebe, Kracauer writes disdainfully of „reine Zerstreuung‟ und „pure 
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Zerstreuung‟, and questions the value of discussing this kind of experience at all: „Soll ich 
seinen Inhalt, der dazu bestimmt ist, eine Stunde lang zu unterhalten und hinterher einer 
ähnlichen Belanglosigkeit wegen radikal vergessen zu werden, ernsthaft zergliedern?  
Vielleicht ist es nicht unnützlich, ihn, der aus dem Nichts gleich ins Nichts schlüpfen will, 
einen Augenblick festzuhalten‟.55  Nevertheless, he persists in surveying such distractions, 
as he had long since accepted that „die Zerstreuung gelangt in ihnen [specifically, the 
shows at Berlin‟s Paläste] zu ihrer Kultur.  Sie gelten der Masse.‟ („Kult der Zerstreuung‟, 
p. 312).  This remark proves how Zerstreuung in Modernism became both an operation – 
diffusing new, multi-dimensional art forms to large audiences – and a cultural genre in 
itself, especially in film and architecture.  These modes find fusion not just in Kracauer‟s 
essay on Berlin‟s Lichtspielhäuser but across his œuvre.56 With the rise of consumerism 
among the salaried (lower-)middle classes, Zerstreuung became a unity and thus lost its 
true meaning as a scattered and incohesive phenomenon.  Kracauer describes this loss 
happening „exemplarisch‟ in the metropolitan cinemas: „Denn, rufen sie auch zur 
Zerstreuung auf, so rauben sie ihr doch sogleich wieder dadurch den Sinn, daß sie die 
Mannigfaltigkeit der Effekte, die ihrem Wesen nach voneinander isoliert zu werden 
verlangen, zur “künstlerischen” Einheit zusammenschweißen, die bunte Reihe der 
Äußerlichkeiten in ein gestalthaftes Ganzes pressen möchten‟ (ibid., p. 315).  Kracauer 
equates Zerstreuung with culture: distraction‟s „Versammlungsorte‟ are deemed „ein 
würdiger Aufenthalt‟ (ibid., p. 311), as their „architektonische Rahmen schon neigt zur 
Betonung der Würde, die den oberen Kunstinstituten eignete‟ (ibid., p. 315).  Kracauer 
therefore paves the way for his near-contemporary Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) to 
elevate the status of Zerstreuung, as well as to expose its shortcomings as a synonym for 
distraction.  However, Kracauer does not necessarily polarise the traditional high culture of 
Sammlung – the intense, individualised contemplation of separate works of art – in the 
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way that Henri Band suggests: „der Begriff der Zerstreuung [. . .] entspricht letztlich einer 
alttestamentarisch-metaphorischen Gegenüberstellung von “Sammlung” als Einkehr, 
Besinnung auf Höheres und Bewahrung einer einheitlichen Form und Ordnung und 
“Zerstreuung” als Ablenkung von diesen Werten, als Opiat und Agens der Auflösung 
gemeinschaftsbindender Normen.  Daß Kracauer zumeist den Begriff der Zerstreuung 
gegenüber dem der Unterhaltung oder des Vergnügens vorzieht, ist dieser kulturkritischen 
Konnotationen geschuldet‟.57  The institution of cinema that Kracauer surveys „beliebt das 
Gehobene und Sakrale, als umfinge er Gebilde von ewiger Dauer; noch ein Schritt weiter, 
und die Weihkerzen leuchten‟ (Kracauer, „Kult‟, p. 315).  While Kracauer‟s (untypical) 
sarcasm here conveys disbelief and thus does not necessarily invalidate Band‟s 
differentiation, both commentators remind us that the conditions of reception contribute to 
our evaluation of a cultural product.  For Kracauer, social space shapes the cultural 
experience in which art such as cinema is presented.   
 
Furthermore, in its synonymity with Ablenkung, Zerstreuung deviates from Sammlung. The 
more that Zerstreuung becomes habitual – or even turns into „die Zerstreuungssucht‟  
(Kracauer, „Kult‟, p. 313) – the more problematical meta-Ablenkung, or distraction from the 
concomitant state of Unaufmerksamkeit, becomes.  In his study of Die Angestellten, 
Kracauer cites a shorthand typist who expresses her aversion to serious conversation 
during her leisure time: „“Ernste Unterhaltungen”, sagte sie, “zerstreuen nur und lenken 
von der Umwelt ab, die man genießen möchte”.  Wenn einem ernsten Gespräch 
zerstreuende Wirkungen beigemessen werden, ist es mit der Zerstreuung unerbittlich 
ernst‟.58  Thus, both the calibre and perception of Zerstreuung for the ordinary consumer 
differ from those of the cultural analyst, and we must exercise caution in validating this 
term according to any single definition without emphasising its socio-historical context.   
 
Reproductions of Distraction in Response to Benjamin and Adorno 
 
Despite Manfred Schneider‟s and Samuel Weber‟s recognition of the heritage preceding 
Zerstreuung in the twentieth century, other commentators on the same source material – 
the philosophies of Walter Benjamin, especially as expounded in the essay „Das 
Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit‟ – have persisted in 
mechanically equating Zerstreuung with distraction.  Those who omit to gloss either the 
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German term or its English translation perpetuate the canonical status of Benjamin‟s 
œuvre across the academic humanities not so much as a fragmented body of resonant yet 
incomplete enquiries but as a series of hermeneutic keys, among which Zerstreuung/ 
distraction features remarkably prominently for a topic interwoven into only a handful of 
Benjamin‟s pages.  Zerstreuung, even more than distraction is anything but a 
straightforward concept to pinpoint in its own right, let alone to translate; it is problematised 
further when it is opposed to equally problematical and arbitrarily translated German terms 
that convey concentration (especially in relation to attention or contemplation). 
  
In Benjamin‟s „Kunstwerk‟ essay, the Zerstreuung engendered by recorded images has 
further evolved to become a mode of participation in a kind of decentred intersubjectivity – 
quite the opposite of the displacement involved in Kracauer‟s typist‟s Zerstreuung.59  Three 
Benjamin specialists, Howard Eiland, Graeme Gilloch and Lutz Koepnick, who survey 
Zerstreuung more widely across Benjamin‟s œuvre, do not problematise its translation as 
„distraction‟.  Equating Modernist Zerstreuung with distraction has become canonical; 
thankfully, however, one commentator at least has succinctly specified an apt construal of 
the term. Michael Taussig, in a study of tactility, usefully acknowledges the apperceptive 
mode of distraction as „the type of flitting and barely conscious peripheral-vision perception 
unleashed with great vigor by modem life at the crossroads of the city, the capitalist 
market, and modem technology. The idealtype here would not be God but movies and 
advertising, and its field of expertise is the modem everyday‟.60  With this definition in 
mind, I shall now deal with Eiland, Gilloch and Koepnick in turn before investigating some 
of Koepnick‟s further reference points, in order to illuminate Benjamin‟s sense of 
distraction as what should best be summarised as dispersed dissemination, to which I 
shall return following this aptly circuitous series of comparisons. 
 
                                            
59
 Three versions of this essay were produced between 1935 and 1939 but they were only fully published in 
German posthumously. My quotations are from the second version (composed 1935-36), which contains the 
most detail on Zerstreuung: in Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften 7:1, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and 
Hermann Schweppenhäuser.  Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1989, pp. 471-508.  Among the plethora of 
commentaries on this essay that seize upon various intertextualities emerging from Benjamin‟s terminology, 
Rodolphe Gasché‟s „Objective Diversions‟ (op. cit.) stresses the sense of shock that compromises the 
viewer‟s assimilation of the stream of images as being in itself a shared element of the cinema-going 
experience.  Shock catalyses multi-modal distraction (as diversion and dispersal of attention as well as 
confusion of mind): „Not only does art in the age of mechanical reproduction deflect from the object, distract, 
as it were, the collective subject of the critical reception of the new art forms is a distracted beholder.  His 
associative mechanisms are interrupted by shock, and although he responds to the shocks that assail him 
through “a heightened presence of the mind”, he does so in a distracted manner.   The collective subject, 
consequently, is neither a substantial nor a formal centre that would ground its autonomy.  It is a distracted 
subject in all senses of the word.‟ (Gasché, p. 194). 
60
 Taussig, „Tactility And Distraction‟, Cultural Anthropology, 6:2 (May 1991), 147-153 (p. 148). 
 31 
Eiland, one of Benjamin‟s American translators, acknowledges that the model of 
Zerstreuung, regardless of its precise definition or its English translation, is not rigid.  He 
notes „a certain inconsistency [. . .] in Benjamin‟s handling of the concept of distraction‟; 
and he warns „it should be kept in mind that, especially in the case of the work of art essay 
and The Arcades, the notion of distraction operates in a particularly slippery manner, such 
as very likely makes this one of the more elusive of Benjaminian topoi‟.61 Indeed, within the 
Arcades project, Benjamin alludes to two signifiers, „Zerstreuung‟ and „Zerstreutheit‟ in the 
context of the task of the collector; Eiland cites this juxtaposition of „the struggle against 
dispersion [Zerstreuung]‟, which constitutes „the most deeply hidden motive of the person 
who collects‟, with „the confusion, [. . .] the scatter [Zerstreutheit] in which the things of the 
world are found‟.62  For the translator, of all scholars, to emphasise these quite differently 
connoted English signifiers and to note their more similar but nevertheless separate 
German –ung and –heit counterparts, indicates to the reader an agglomeration of 
distractions rather than the neat conglomeration of „ontological‟ and „epistemological‟ 
distractions that Eiland attempts to ringfence.  Eiland‟s and Benjamin‟s intimation here of 
an axiom of distraction as a summative commonplace plotted within a frame is not helpful 
when the framelines – of dispersion/Zerstreuung and (the more negative) 
scatter(edness)/Zerstreutheit – are themselves assertions of non-linearity rather than 
linear axes within which a collector operates, but between which no single point of 
collectedness can be reached.  Eiland proceeds by positing „ontological scatter‟ as being 
„accessible to an intensively scattered perception‟, and by situating at the confluence of 
these two conditions „the articulation of dispersion‟ (Eiland, p. 63).  This articulation is most 
obviously Benjamin‟s own achievement in his dissemination of diverse aesthetics of 
collecting, architecture, spectatorship and wandering – not to mention the life-writing 
impulse that draws these together.  In addition, the articulation of „the challenge of 
discovering a form commensurate with the entropic or centrifugal tendency of modern 
experience‟ (ibid.) and of the aesthetic value of pursuing the challenge itself is dispersed 
across the work of diffuse practitioners.  To isolate, say, the literary from the graphical, 
musical, theatrical or cinematic in its concentration on this challenge would thus seem 
arbitrary.  Yet, interdisciplinarity demands an integration of modes of articulation that is 
inconsistent with the „dis-integrated form‟ (ibid.) that the topos of dispersion represents.  
Eiland steers us towards evaluating the particular combination of modes of distraction in 
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literature, Benjamin‟s favoured form for his own practice, in which „an articulation of 
dispersion‟ is „a possible purchase on what is meant by “literary montage” in The Arcades 
Project‟ (ibid.).  „Dispersion‟ and „scatter(edness)‟ become, to all intents and purposes, 
coterminous in Eiland‟s rhetoric.  Yet, by avoiding explicit synonymity with „distraction‟, he 
enables us to trace a meta-distraction in artistic responses to what these terms signify, and 
thereby to alert us to our own „reception in distraction‟.  
 
Three of Eiland‟s further observations should prefigure both our reading of the „Kunstwerk‟ 
essay and any equivalence we grant Benjamin‟s Zerstreuung to any particular denotation 
of distraction.  Firstly, by requoting from Benjamin‟s third version of his essay a citation 
from the French author Georges Duhamel about being overcome by the moving image, 
Eiland situates distraction not only as the convergence of Zerstreuung and Verstörung at 
the point where the spectator perceives its effect but also as interruption – which happens 
to be a synonym in French for distraction in the sense of a loss of attention: „the train of 
associations in the person wishing to contemplate one of these images is immediately 
interrupted by new images, and this, Benjamin goes on to say, constitutes the shock effect 
of film‟ (Eiland, p. 56).  Secondly, Eiland argues conveniently that in the „Kunstwerk‟ essay, 
„distraction, in a properly modern context, must itself be understood dialectically – that is to 
say, beyond the simple opposition of distraction and concentration‟ (p. 57).  A concept that 
is predicated on complex conflict can surely only be signified by an arbitrary choice of 
terminology.  While Zerstreuung as manifolding conveys a sense of multiplication, if not 
doubling, such qualities are not evident in distraction.  Thirdly, Eiland endows distraction 
with the duality of „dis-„ and „-traction‟, although he does not comment on this.  On the one 
hand, distraction conveys and promotes disregard to its students; on the other, it sets 
attention in motion, exemplified both by the locomotion of flâneurs and by consumers 
perusing arcades: „the opposition now would seem to be between mere distraction and, 
shall we say, productive distraction – between distraction as a skewing of attention, or as 
abandonment to diversion, and distraction as a spur to new ways of perceiving.  In either 
case, a certain wandering or dispersion makes itself felt‟ (p. 55).   
 
The infrastructure, or “housing”, of institutions such as cinema and shopping belies – or 
even exacerbates – a state of homelessness in the Zerstreuung which they encourage.  
To this end, Graeme Gilloch, in analysing Modernist „distraction‟ as one of the key Critical 
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Constellations to be extrapolated from Benjamin‟s œuvre,63 compares Kracauer‟s and 
Benjamin‟s approaches to Zerstreuung, emphasising Kracauer‟s treatment in „Kult der 
Zerstreuung‟ of „a form of emotional and ideological compensation for the bureaucratized, 
spiritually “homeless” condition endured by the new mass of metropolitan white-collar 
workers‟.  Where home life was not built up sufficiently to complement or ease the 
unstimulating and confining experience of employment in tertiary industry, the role of 
leisure time and facilities expanded exponentially.  Leisure became “housed” within the 
metropolitan superstructure, not only in cinemas, bars and shops but within the planned 
developments of cities, their grids of streets and transportation systems, thus facilitating 
the transition between working, living and leisure environments in terms of the short 
distances and journey times between them.  Yet, the picture palaces were furnished in 
such a way as to distract their visitors from the transitory nature of their experience of the 
amenity, which was itself supplanted on each visit by the transitory experience of each film 
screened and its appeal to the audience‟s senses.   
 
Lutz Koepnick‟s analysis of Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power64 is especially 
conspicuous in its lack of a detailed breakdown of either the connotations of German 
terminology relating to distraction or the author‟s own choice of English translations.  In 
identifying the precedence of modern visual culture over oral traditions, Koepnick implies 
its paradoxical aesthetic appeal to the spectator, who is „attracted to what diverts‟ (p. 155).   
Koepnick‟s context is the fragmented form of early 20th-century journalism, which „pictures 
and fragments the world through snapshot-like information in order to divert the reader‟ (p. 
153); thus, the act of attracting the reader-viewer‟s attention through a combination of 
headline text and photography results in distraction. 
 
Koepnick proceeds to refer ambiguously to „visual distraction‟, in the context of the world 
fairs and Parisian arcades scrutinised in Benjamin‟s Pasagenwerk, and to their „distracted 
subjects‟ (p. 166). While the wandering voyeurs of the 19th century contrast with the „daily 
living-room routine‟ of „contemporary couch potatoes‟, their parallel subjection to „the 
image-based clash of different temporalities and incompatible social topographies‟ (p. 213) 
is the corollary of alluring spectacles – where early Modernist film provides an exhibition-
like experience that „directly solicits spectator attention‟, as Tom Gunning identifies in „The 
Cinema of Attractions‟ (op. cit., p. 231) – and the equation of spectatorship with 
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consumerism.  Yet, Koepnick‟s repeated references to Benjamin‟s „category of distraction‟ 
– „celebratory and deterministic‟ in one of the five allusions over three pages (p. 220); 
„postauratic‟ in another (p. 222) – point, in the absence of firm definition, to the enduring 
impact of Benjamin‟s treatment of Zerstreuung as diversification.  In the arena of gender 
politics, Koepnick cites Patrice Petro‟s study Joyless Streets: Women and Melodramatic 
Representation in Weimar Germany,65 which is notable not only for its identification of a 
paradigm shift in Benjamin‟s discourse from aura to distraction (Koepnick, p. 222), but also 
for its recognition of Modernist cinema as a turning-point for women‟s involvement in the 
discourses of entertainment.  In particular, Weimar melodrama disengaged male 
intellectuals but activated female cultural expression.  Petro‟s treatment of distraction, 
while slanted towards a gendered approach, is reliable as she takes and compares her 
references from the heterogeneous contexts of Kracauer, Benjamin and Heidegger (and 
from Derrida‟s response to the latter).  Moreover, she signifies in her use of inverted 
commas the status of „distraction‟ as a representation of both a mode of perception and its 
effects.66 To appreciate the importance of distraction beyond Koepnick‟s framing of its 
manifestations in Modernist theory, we should return to Petro‟s observation that the effects 
on audiences of technological advances endure most specifically within the context of 
cinema: „Contemporary film theorists retain the assumption that film technology so 
profoundly alters perception and experience that it completely reorganizes the spectator‟s 
relationship to space, vision and structures of desire‟ (Petro, p. 120).  Yet, rather than 
either elucidate his own definition of „distraction‟ or signpost this specific assertion of 
Petro‟s that distraction is a multiple reconfiguration or renegotiation, Koepnick contrasts 
the empowering status of „Benjamin‟s category of postauratic distraction‟ with Adorno‟s 
negative and dismissive interpretation of an enslaving „postauratic inattentiveness‟ 
(Koepnick, p. 221).  Koepnick thus posits distraction-as-Unaufmerksamkeit as a dialectical 
response to distraction-as-Zerstreuung.  His inclusion of Adorno‟s philosophy steers the 
discussion away from Zerstreuung as spectacle and, in its synonymity with Unterhaltung 
(entertainment), towards Unaufmerksamkeit.   
 
Negatively prefixed, like distraction, Un-aufmerksamkeit presupposes absences.  While, as 
we have seen, Zerstreutheit tends to denote absentmindedness, and Verstörtheit the 
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disturbance or loss of a presence of mind, Koepnick regards inattentiveness in modern 
mass media consumption as identified by Adorno as a condition in which the 
distinctiveness of discrete cultural objects is missing.  This kind of Unaufmerksamkeit is a 
form of subjugating connectedness that counters the fragmentation of traditional 
contemplative rituals: „distraction transforms disconnected parts into fetishes in front of 
which “consumers become temple slaves”‟.67  An audience distracted in this way by 
entertainment as a sum of parts sacrifices control over varying the attention it pays to any 
of these parts individually.  Raymond Williams wrote, before the multi-channel age, of the 
behavioural effects on society of the reproduction of drama: „Fiction; acting; idle dreaming 
and vicarious spectacle; the simultaneous satisfaction of sloth and appetite; distraction 
from distraction by distraction‟.68  Williams had identified this interminable distraction 
process in a previous study (not of writing but of television!) as having emerged at the turn 
of the twentieth century, when the theatre of August Strindberg revealed an „interesting 
and complex relationship between dramatic structures and the new technological means of 
production‟ that was to intensify in early German experimental cinema.  The roots of this 
relationship can be discerned in Shakespeare‟s innovative juxtaposition in Troilus and 
Cressida of the dialogue between Diomedes and Cressida meeting in secret with that of 
Ulysses and Troilus who overhear them, where Ulysses remarks to Troilus „You flow to 
great distraction‟.69 Adorno, in common with his near-contemporaries in Germany, as well 
as with Williams and the most recent generations of media theorists, problematises the 
confluence of entertainment, distraction and concentration.  Unlike them, however, 
Adorno‟s attitude towards cinema is dismissive: to him, the “talkies” „sind so angelegt, daß 
ihre adäquate Auffassung zwar Promptheit, Beobachtungsgabe, Versiertheit erheischt, 
daß sie aber die denkende Aktivität des Betrachters geradezu verbieten, wenn er nicht die 
vorbeihuschenden Fakten versäumen will‟.70  Television, too, Adorno believes, is harmful 
to its viewer, as it engenders a false sense of proximity to its presentations rather than 
prompting critical distance from them.  Koepnick, in Framing Attention, cites Adorno‟s 
„Prolog zum Fernsehen‟ from 1953, and adds that „television [. . .] produces forms of 
distraction that subject the viewer to improved strategies of discipline and manipulation: “In 
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that television awakens and visually represents what preconceptually slumbers in the 
viewer, it at the same time prescribes them [sic!] how to behave”‟.71   
 
Another of Adorno‟s prominent discussions of distraction focuses on the mechanical 
reproduction of music rather than on audio-visual media.  Writing in the USA in English in 
1941, far from rendering popular musical entertainment and inattentiveness coterminously, 
he situates distraction as operating in parallel to the absence of attention: „The frame of 
mind to which popular music originally appealed, on which it feeds, and which it 
perpetually reinforces, is simultaneously one of distraction and inattention. Listeners are 
distracted from the demands of reality by entertainment which does not demand attention 
either.‟72  Adorno considered this form of diversion to provide an undemanding one-
dimensional escape from the effort of navigating multi-dimensional reality: in particular, an 
escape from negotiating one‟s place in a competitive society where subjugation to the 
market forces and mass culture that had grown to dictate the lives of urban professionals 
had become the norm.  This negotiation had once been engendered by concentrated 
contemplation of serious art, and later by navigating new configurations in work and leisure 
time, as identified by Simmel and Kracauer.  By the 1930s, however, cultural engagement 
was forced out by concentration of a new kind that continues to be consolidated to this 
day: namely, the highly concentrated cultural production in the industries of mainstream 
popular culture, where a few major players compete to dominate the mass market and 
hook consumers with easily identifiable and digestible wares.  These products of 
distraction offer instant gratification individually, but they are too standardised and 
ephemeral to merit sustained commentary at any critical distance, other than typology and 
socio-political analysis – which Adorno combines in his philosophy.  For Adorno, 
„distraction is bound to the present mode of production, to the rationalized and mechanized 
process of labor to which, directly or indirectly, masses are subject. This mode of 
production, which engenders fears and anxiety about unemployment, loss of income, war, 
has its "non-productive" correlate in entertainment; that is, relaxation which does not 
involve the effort of concentration at all. People want to have fun. A fully concentrated and 
conscious experience of art is possible only to those whose lives do not put such a strain 
on them that in their spare time they want relief from both boredom and effort 
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simultaneously. The whole sphere of cheap commercial entertainment reflects this dual 
desire‟ (ibid., p. 451).   
 
Furthermore, Adorno and Max Horkheimer bemoan in their Dialektik der Aufklärung the 
„Reproduktion des Immergleichen‟ (Dialektik, p. 56).  Although the semantic connection of 
„Reproduktion‟ to our understanding of Zerstreuung as dissemination contributes to the 
association of contemporary entertainment with distraction, the relationship of the 
„Immergleichen‟ to distraction is cemented when Unaufmerksamkeit is added to the 
formula.  Producers and consumers are inattentive to the possibilities of novelty in form 
and content, as minor variations on the same product continue to be supplied and 
demanded: „Das Neue der massenkulturellen Phase gegenüber der spätliberalen ist der 
Ausschluß des Neuen. Die Maschine rotiert auf der gleichen Stelle‟ (ibid.).  The age of 
mechanical reproduction ushered in the pursuit of mechanical reduction for the masses; 
the shrinkage in size of high fidelity recordings and devices attracts and distracts today‟s 
fashion-conscious consumers just as the technological innovations of the mid-twentieth 
century shifted critical attention away from the works they reproduced: „Daß ihre 
charakteristischen Neuerungen durchweg bloß in Verbesserungen der 
Massenreproduktion bestehen, ist dem System nicht äußerlich. Mit Grund heftet sich das 
Interesse ungezählter Konsumenten an die Technik, nicht an die starr repetierten, 
ausgehöhlten und halb schon preisgegebenen Inhalte‟ (ibid.). 
 
Popular music as characterised by Adorno, its subsequent evolution having been marked 
by the concentrations of synthesised instrumentation and compressed dynamics, is not the 
only form of cultural production that has become concentrated in such a way as to 
minimise fluctuation in its consumers‟ putatively limited attention spans.  Take, for 
example, the current ubiquity of podcasting, in which various kinds of content, including 
academic lectures, are offered in a condensed form, often by individuals rather than via 
powerful corporations in the entertainment industry (with the exception of the internet 
service providers who provide the channel of distribution): in this instance, power has been 
scattered far beyond mainstream industry structures.  Listening and writing in an age of 
low-fidelity, monaural reproduction, Adorno did not foresee the double-edged sword of 
empowerment that was to be granted to consumers by technologies such as the remote 
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control panel and, very recently, on-demand streaming services.73  Our control over our 
audio and audio-visual entertainment at the touch of any of a proliferation of buttons for 
functions beyond the simplest binary of „power on/off‟ has extended our potential, if not our 
actual, choice of media consumption configurations – depending on our competence and 
desire to handle the technology, as well as on our access to the channels of distribution of 
the relevant media, as determined by content or service providers.  Yet, in navigating 
between channels, tracks or pages nowadays, we manipulate a polysemic flow – a 
dispersion, or Zerstreuung – of entertainment sources, none of which are allowed to 
sustain our attention for long enough to bring about concentration, but all of which succeed 
in entering our awareness.   
 
Dialectical understanding of Benjamin‟s Zerstreuung as proposed by Eiland (p. 57) 
presupposes the interoperability of this signification of distraction with other concepts; our 
perceptions of Zerstreuung must evolve rather than be modelled on a fixed definition.  
Distraction, more than the individual German signifiers, enables this interoperation.  Only 
when alternatives to the signifier Zerstreuung are possible, and only when it is placed in 
dialogue with other alignments of awareness or attention – not just a grouping of terms 
that fall under the heading of concentration – can the multiple dimensions and dynamics of 
distraction be properly investigated.  The official English translation of Benjamin‟s 
„Kunstwerk‟ essay is not helpful in this regard: in the latter sections of the German version, 
one key observation about „Ablenkung‟ immediately precedes three series of remarks 
pertaining to „Zerstreuung‟; but all of these have been rendered in the translation as 
„distraction‟, without regard for Benjamin‟s terminological distinction.  Let us now turn to 
Benjamin‟s essay, which demonstrates how all of these remarks are associated with other 
problematical terms, which I have distinguished in bold type below: 
i) „Der Versenkung, die in der Entartung des Bürgertums eine Schule asozialen 
Verhaltens wurde, tritt die Ablenkung als eine Spielart sozialen Verhaltens gegenüber.‟  
(p. 379) 
ii) (Given that the masses seek „Zerstreuung‟ in a work of art whereas the lover of art 
collects his thoughts before it): ‘Zerstreuung und Sammlung [the opposite of 
„Zerstreuung‟, where the act of contemplation gathers together thoughts rather than 
allowing them to become dispersed] stehen in einem Gegensatz, der folgende 
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Formulierung erlaubt: Der vor dem Kunstwerk sich Sammelnde versenkt sich darein [. . .].  
Dagegen versenkt die zerstreute Masse ihrerseits das Kunstwerk in sich‟. (p. 380) 
iii) „Gewöhnen kann sich auch der Zerstreute.  Mehr: gewisse Aufgaben in der 
Zerstreuung bewältigen zu können, erweist erst, daß sie zu lösen einem zur Gewohnheit 
geworden ist‟ (p. 381); and, as a result, 
iv) „Die Rezeption in der Zerstreuung, die sich mit wachsendem Nachdruck auf allen 
Gebieten der Kunst bemerkbar macht und das Symptom von tiefgreifenden 
Veränderungen der Apperzeption ist, hat am Film ihr eigentliches Übungsinstrument‟ (p. 
381). 
These remarks are connected by the sense of Versenkung – or immersion – that occurs in 
contemplation, in diversion and where dispersed perceptions become habitual, such as 
when the cinemagoer takes in a range of scenes in a continuous showing.  As I shall now 
demonstrate, Versenkung distinguishes Benjamin‟s understanding of Zerstreuung from 
Ablenkung; and Zerstreuung shares with „distraction‟ only a problematical ambiguity, not 
least for English translators.   
 
In the first remark cited above, Benjamin opposes not Zerstreuung but Ablenkung, with its 
connotations of deviation and disconnection, to Versenkung: his prime example is of 
Dadaism, „eine recht vehemente Ablenkung‟ in its subversive treatment of works of art as 
vehicles for „Skandals‟ (p. 379) rather than as sites for bourgeois contemplation.  
Ablenkung amounts to sudden, sharp shock: an „ablenkendes Element‟ also came to 
prominence in the ever-shifting settings and focus in early cinema, still a novelty for 
Benjamin, „welche stoßweise auf den Beschauer eindringen‟ (ibid.).  By contrast, the 
persistent nature of Versenkung is also to be found in the perpetual reconfiguration of 
Zerstreuung.  In his fragmentary notes for a „Theorie der Zerstreuung‟, which he was never 
to complete, produced alongside the second version of the „Kunstwerk‟ essay, Benjamin 
signals his strong intention to investigate „das Verhältnis der Zerstreuung zur 
Einverleibung‟; he does not use the term Versenkung here at all.74  Einverleibung is 
commonly translated as „assimilation‟, which is not usually coterminous with any markedly 
contemplative element of „immersion‟, although both Versenkung and Einverleibung 
convey a sense of „absorption‟.  The official translation of Benjamin‟s notes uses this latter, 
ambiguous term,75 reflecting the way in which Benjamin himself takes for granted the 
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interplay of both distinctions and connections between spectators‟ levels of engagement 
with works of art, which we can discern from the last three of his four remarks cited above.  
 
In Benjamin‟s second remark, Versenkung is a component of the opposing processes of 
Sammlung and Zerstreuung, albeit in contrasting directions: Zerstreuung cannot therefore 
be contrasted with Versenkung as clearly as Ablenkung can.  Sammlung and Zerstreuung 
alike can result, as Benjamin‟s third remark specifies, in the formation of habitual 
behaviour assimilated from the context in which the spectator is absorbed: „Gewohnheit‟, 
Benjamin‟s chosen term in the essay, resonates with „Einverleibung‟ in his notes, as well 
as with Kant‟s distinction of absentia from abstractio.   
 
In the Zerstreuung of film, unlike either the Versenkung relating to a personal thought or 
the Sammlung of traditional high art, however, habitual behaviour is conditioned and 
modulated to a much greater extent by the work of art.  Whereas Sammlung attunes the 
individual spectator‟s mind to developing an interpretation that he is subsequently 
responsible for disseminating, Benjamin‟s fourth remark in the essay contextualises the 
habit-formation of Zerstreuung as the cinemagoers‟ pre-conditioned response en masse to 
interpretations that evolve on screen. Benjamin‟s essay bears witness to the revolutionary 
Ablenkung of the Dadaists – to a movement, in one sense of the term, being usurped 
barely a generation later by another kind of movement, the moving image, which creates 
and disseminates its own „Schockwirkung‟ (p. 381). The shock has been moderated by its 
dispersal across this new form of art, as well as by the „Einverleibung‟ of its viewers, who 
assimilate and absorb content that is responding to them all the time that their „Rezeption 
in der Zerstreuung‟ limits their response to it.   
 
Taking stock of my historical analysis of Zerstreuung so far, I am mindful of its dilating 
terms of reference, taking in “texts” in the broadest sense, from philosophy via psychology 
to the visual arts.  This investigation could proceed much further at or between any of the 
staging posts that have already marked its course.  Chronologically, however, certain 
developments of the last sixty years or so encourage us to backtrack and draw protracted, 
although relatively straight lines connecting the insights we have gained from earlier 
manifestations of distraction.  Benjamin‟s „Rezeption in der Zerstreuung‟ remains resonant 
at an interdisciplinary level because it acknowledges the absorption of multiple modes of 
”reading” in media consumption: visual literacy, familiarity with technological devices and 
acquaintance with long-established fabula transferred to a narrative form that is also 
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canonical all no longer shock or lead the “reader” astray.  Already in Benjamin‟s dialectical 
space of Zerstreuung and Versenkung, for example, William James‟s separate spheres of 
the passive intellectual mode of attention that acknowledges inattentiveness and of the 
Zerstreutheit that is opposed to attention in general loom large: and James‟s contrast 
needs to be reaffirmed if Benjamin‟s juxtaposed dialectics are to be unravelled.  In 
James‟s terms, Benjamin‟s Versenkung belongs to passive intellectual attention; it is not 
an active form of attention, as awareness comes over rather than attention being activated 
in an operation of attending to something.  Passive intellectual attention, as we have 
established, embraces Unaufmerksamkeit: attention to all but the object of contemplation 
is displaced or absent, so dispersal of thoughts – or Zerstreuung – is suspended.   
However, Benjamin‟s sense of Zerstreuung is remote from the unsettled, scatterbrained 
mode of Zerstreutheit proposed by James, as it is a component rather than an opponent of 
attention.  I would venture to situate Benjamin‟s Zerstreuung as a variant form of passive 
intellectual attention in the context of reception, where the receiver is attuned and 
accustomed to being bombarded with attention-capturing devices dispersed across the 
film or text. 
 
Unruhe: Determining and Perpetuating Distraction 
 
I do not intend to lose sight of my prime concern with distraction in novelistic and 
autobiographical writing as my project expands.  My concern is strengthened, not 
weakened, by the circumstances of displacement in which this endeavour has had to be 
developed.  The woefully contracting accommodation in British modern languages of 
literary studies that are profitably supported, rather than supplanted, by film studies 
amongst other modes of creative and critical thinking threatens to render my undertaking 
less vital than I am striving to prove it to be.  Literary modelling requires historico-cultural 
and philosophical underpinnings, and for distraction these are large and broad enough to 
entail a study of their own.  These foundation stones also ensure that presentations of 
distraction as an idiosyncratic operation are validated, enabling the study to refer 
illustratively and incisively to apposite passages of literature that stand the best chance of 
appealing and enduring within market-driven university curricula when they are packaged 
as emblematic of a fundamental, rather than abstruse phenomenon, which distraction 
represents.  Popular books – more popular, that is, outside German-speaking countries 
than the acclaimed and canonical works of, for instance, Kafka, Handke and Frisch – are 
often labelled „page-turners‟ by readers and critics, with or without negative connotations.  
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In German, the equivalent term, Spannende Bücher, is proudly displayed in catalogue 
sections and conspicuously above shelves in bookshops.  The English and German terms 
alike encapsulate the restless state in which sustained contact with textual narration is 
most likely to be accomplished in the multi-media age.  Spannung and – crucially – Unruhe 
may not saturate literary narrative beyond the blockbusters, but they feature episodically, 
and need to be promoted for their effects that are unparalleled in other media.  Tension or 
Spannung is variously a cause and a symptom of distraction; Unruhe is the remaining 
common but slightly less obvious translation of distraction, and the missing link between 
the verstört, zerstreut and unaufmerksam modes that I have outlined so far.  
 
Restlessness engenders narration and meta-narration.  Diary or notebook entries are 
scribbled furiously and reworked into a more public and polished form – if time, health and 
means of support allow. Once authors have died (typically), their most supportive but 
restless readers and scholars do not settle for the editorially sanctioned published versions 
alone, but seek to access archives of Nachlässe and as many supporting documents as 
can be mustered.  Restlessness also affects the subject-matter of the literary text, beyond 
being thematised in itself: autobiography, infamously, is considered incomplete until the 
writer has narrated his own death; but in (ostensible) works of fiction, too, authors such as 
Bernhard, Genazino and Max Frisch76 who deal with other modes of distraction have 
relentlessly prolonged their mining of the same, rich seams.  For Genazino in particular, 
the minutiae of the most ordinary everyday lives repeatedly attract and then distract 
narration.  His protagonists are unsettled by the same elemental sensations: shame, 
discarded objects, passers-by and misread signs, and neither they nor the narrative they 
engender will rest easy until they have drawn some conclusion from these signals that 
feeds back into the banality of the moment of encounter.  Significantly, Genazino counts 
among his influences the Portuguese author Fernando Pessoa‟s Das Buch der Unruhe.77  
True to form, a single, succinct but deceptive metaphor from this work – „Ich weiß von 
nichts, wie diese Dächer‟ – suffices for Genazino to seek, gain and disseminate insight in a 
single-page commentary in Achtung Baustelle that reverberates through his own œuvre.78  
                                            
76
 One of Frisch‟s “specialities” in his novels is the Zerstreuung of his protagonists‟ self-identity and social 
identity as distractions from each other. 
77
 Originally Livro do Desassossego, first published posthumously in 1982, 47 years after Pessoa‟s death; 
four English translations of The Book of Disquiet[/ude] appeared in 1991. 
78
 Genazino, Achtung Baustelle, p. 23.  This piece nestles between a commentary on a remark from Walter 
Benjamin‟s Moskauer Tagebuch – „”Ich lese auf meinem Zimmer Proust, fresse dazu Marzipan”‟ (pp. 21-3) – 
and Wolfgang Hildesheimer‟s reworking of Mozart‟s Requiem – „”Herr, gib ihnen die ewige Ruhe nicht.”‟ (pp. 
24-25).  It is not only this fashioning of Unruhe that marks Hildesheimer [1916-91] out for inclusion in my 
projected survey of authors of distraction.  His early short story „Der Urlaub‟, in Lieblose Legende (Frankfurt 
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This insight relates to the distinction between memory – which Genazino‟s protagonists 
tend to release from attic-like stores79 and to disperse fairly voluntarily among the 
distractions that punctuate their negotiations with their daily routines – and intellect, which 
does not usually concern them.   Genazino‟s interpretation of Pessoa‟s metaphor reflects 
the pointlessness conveyed by so many of his protagonists and third-person narrators of 
conflating memory with understanding or knowledge:  
Ich brauchte nur wenig nachdenken, und es fielen mir immer mehr Geschichten und 
Details von Menschen ein, die zwar gebildet sind, ihre Bildung aber nicht oder nicht 
ausreichend genug nutzen können; das Wissen erscheint ihnen, weil es 
lebenspraktisch oft ohne Wert bleibt, wie eine andere Form des Nichtwissens.  Und 
plötzlich sah ich ein, daß die Metapher von Fernando Pessoa punktgenau trifft: Die 
Dächer wissen zwar alles, aber sie (beziehungsweise wir) haben nichts davon. 
(Ibid.) 
 
Genazino implies here that displaying „Wissen‟ for its own sake is, for many, immaterial: 
the contributions they seek to make to the world are, rather, „lebenspraktisch‟.  Surveying 
Genazino‟s œuvre, we find that a balance between creative, entertaining practice in the 
novels and epistemological reflection in the essays has been struck: he attends to 
narratorial interpretation in his non-fiction, leaving his characters to attend to their 
dispersed perceptions in his creative works.   
 
Writing which, like other forms of knowledge transfer, is promulgated for the sake of 
„Wissen‟, or in other words for settling on an interpretation, should not distract us from 
literature that mirrors or projects the inconclusive diversions of life in general.  An attraction 
of Kant‟s and Benjamin‟s theories that endures despite their anchoring in ever more 
historical contexts, is in their distraction from our experiences of Zerstreuung today.  
Characterising „Der Geist der Unruhe‟ in 1930, the literary critic Hermann Kesten observes 
dual operations of restless distraction-seeking in these two modes of writing and reading. 
His words remain poignant today; they provide a fitting conclusion to my tracing of a 
constellation of points of distraction in a larger cosmos that the scholar strives to prospect, 
observe and chart, but within which the Geist of the reader never fails to be distracted by 
alluring novelties: 
                                                                                                                                                 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1962 [1
st
 ed. 1952], pp. 128-136) is an archetypal portrayal of a well-intentioned 
protagonist (named, not untypically for Hildesheimer‟s figures, Adrian) who is beset by multiple, conflicting 
forms of distraction at inopportune moments – including, crucially, being overcome by drowsiness and 
missing the last opportunity to be carried by locomotion to his ultimate destination.  I am working on a 
commentary on this tale for inclusion at the heart of my extended project. 
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Die Stellung der Literatur war immer zweifelhaft in der Welt [. . .].  Um so 
zweifelhafter wurde sie in einer Welt, die sich selber bis zur Irrealität zweifelhaft 
wurde.  In einem Leben voller Unruhe und Angst vor dem Leben, das in der Kultur 
vor allem das Unbehagen spürt, hinter allen Gesetzen die Willkür sieht, das die 
Wirtschaft moralisch und rationell zu machen, Ratio und Moral zu industrialisieren, 
ja zu verwirtschaften sucht; in einem Leben, dessen Sinn nicht nur einigen 
denkenden Individuen, sondern auch den Massen verlorenging, dessen 
Philosophen die Wahrheit nur eine von vielen Wahrscheinlichkeiten heißen und in 
der Existenz den ganzen Sinn der Existenz sehen, in einem solchen gefährlichen 
und bitteren Leben verwechselt Mann zu leicht den Apparat des Geistes mit dem 
Geist des Lebens. [. . .] In Deutschland wagen es gar die Theoretiker unter den 
Literaten, die vom Worte lebenden Kritiker, den Literaten vorzuwerfen, sie seien 
Literaten und hätten Vernunft, oder wie man das neuerdings heißt, sie seien 
“Intellektuelle”.  Diese Vokabel gilt als ein Schimpf.  Intellektuelle machen Jagd auf 
Intellektuelle. [. . . Der] Geist der Unruhe und der Neuerungssucht, diesem 
vielgeschmähten und revolutionären Geiste, ist keine Grenze gesetzt.80 
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